THIS RESEARCH REPORT EXPRESSES SOLELY OUR OPINIONS. Use Glaucus Research Group California, LLC's research opinions at your own risk. This is not investment advice nor should it be construed as such. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decisions with respect to the securities covered herein. We have a short interest in CTEG's stock and therefore stand to realize significant gains in the event that the price of such instrument declines. Please refer

to our full disclaimer located on the last page of this report.

COMPANY: CT Environmental Group Ltd. | HK: 1363 INDUSTRY: Wastewater Treatment

Price (as of 11/22/2016):

HKD 2.14

Market Cap:

HKD 13.52 billion

## Daily Volume:

9 million shares (avg. 3mo)

Glaucus Valuation:

HKD 0.38



CT Environmental Group Ltd (HK: 1363) ("<u>CTEG</u>" or the "<u>Company</u>") primarily engages in industrial wastewater treatment and hazardous waste disposal. In a crowded and heavily regulated industry where prices are typically set by the Chinese government, CTEG has reported margins far in excess of its competitors. It claims that its success is driven by its business model of building, owning and operating wastewater treatment facilities (the "BOO" model).

In this report, we present publicly available wastewater treatment data from the Chinese government which directly contradicts CTEG's reported wastewater treatment volumes at two of its primary facilities. In our opinion, this is clear and irrefutable evidence that the Company has lied to the investing public about the volume of water treated at its facilities and as a result, its reported revenues and profitability. This report also presents SAIC filings and other government records showing that, in our opinion, CTEG has engaged in undisclosed related party acquisitions of companies secretly connected to its Chairman. Shockingly, we have found evidence of intimate dealings with the former chairman of China Metal Recycling, which Glaucus exposed as a fraud in 2013 (report available here) and which was subsequently liquidated by Hong Kong regulators.

When we consider the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the Company is materially misrepresenting its reported financial performance and that its management is so untrustworthy that CTEG is simply <u>uninvestable</u>. But to be conservative, we value CTEG's shares at HKD 0.38 per share, an 82% downside from the current share price. Given that CTEG's debt levels have ballooned to RMB 2.3 billion in 1H 2016, we believe that it is reasonable to expect even further downside pressure on the Company's shares.

- 1. Inflation of Reported Wastewater Treatment Volumes. Because wastewater treatment is a highly regulated business, the Ministry of Environmental Protection ("<u>MEP</u>") publishes an annual list of the volume of wastewater processed at key facilities in China. This data directly contradicts the Company's reported figures for the utilization of two key facilities.
  - a. Xintao. CTEG's Guangzhou Xintao Industrial Park Treatment Facility ("Xintao") is the Company's primary wastewater BOO facility, with total design capacity for wastewater treatment of 100,000m³ per day. CTEG claimed that Xintao operated at 97%, 99% and 100% capacity utilization in 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. But the MEP's National Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities Lists state unequivocally that the Xintao facility only processed 54,400m³ in average daily volume in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively. These lists are published annually, are unambiguous and are corroborated by other sources. In our opinion, the lists clearly indicate that the Company overstated the amount of wastewater processed at the Xintao facility by more than 82% from 2012-2014.
  - b. Yinglong. MEP data shows a similar exaggeration of actual wastewater treatment volumes at another key facility, the Guangzhou Yinglong Wastewater Treatment Company Limited ("Yinglong"). Yinglong, also operated by CTEG using the BOO model, has a treatment capacity of 100,000m³ per day. CTEG disclosed that Yinglong operated at 73%, 80% and 90% capacity in 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. However, the MEP data states that Yinglong only treated 49,300m³ of wastewater per day in 2012, and only 53,800m³ in 2013 and 2014. This data indicates that CTEG overstated the amount of wastewater treated at the Yinglong facility by over 54% in those three years.
  - c. Profit Overstatement. MEP data indicates that the Company significantly overstated the utilization rates and therefore the volume of water processed at its two key BOO facilities. Because CTEG's wastewater treatment segment from its BOO facilities is the Company's primary driver of profitability, we estimate that CTEG's gross profit from its BOO segment was 67% less than reported for that segment from 2012-2014.

- 2. Den of Thieves. In 2013, Glaucus released a report alerting the market that according to MEP data, Hong Kong listed China Metal Recycling (HK: 0773) ("CMR") was a blatant fraud that was fabricating its reported revenues and profits. In an unprecedented step, the SFC moved to force CMR into liquidation. Hong Kong courts agreed, saying there was "compelling evidence" that CMR had engaged in "industrial scale fraud." CMR was one of the most blatant and aggressive frauds in Hong Kong history. Imagine our surprise when we discovered that CMR's Chairman, Chun Chi-Wai ("Mr. Chun"), was intimately involved in the foundation of CTEG. SAIC filings reveal that disgraced CMR Chairman Chun Chi-Wai was a founding board member of Xintao and Guangzhou Kaizhou, two of the Company's three original PRC operating subsidiaries. In addition, CTEG's Chairman Mr. Tsui Cham To ("Chairman Tsui") was named as Mr. Chun's business partner in CMR's Global Offering and, among other things, purchased assets from CMR prior to CMR's IPO. Such records suggest that CMR's disgraced chairman was intimately involved in the construction of CTEG and that CTEG's Chairman Tsui maintained close ties with the orchestrator of the one of the most notorious stock frauds in Hong Kong history.
- 3. Inflated Purchase Price for Undisclosed Related Party Acquisitions. In 2015, CTEG acquired 100% equity interests in three facilities for a total aggregate consideration of RMB 276 million. But this understates the cost to shareholders. The three acquired entities also carried on their books a total of RMB 352 million in mysterious payables to undisclosed recipients, meaning that it cost the Company RMB 628 million to acquire three facilities. CTEG claimed that in each case, the beneficial owners of the acquired entities were independent third parties. We believe that this is a lie. SAIC filings reveal that each of the entities was majority owned by Guangzhou Yingzhou Investment Co. Ltd. ("Guangzhou Yingzhou"), an undisclosed related party which we believe is controlled by or connected to CTEG's Chairman. Worse still, SAIC filings show that undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired all three entities for just RMB 46 million one year before flipping them to CTEG at a 6x markup (or a 13.7x markup if the mysterious payables are included). Put simply, public records indicate that CTEG's Chairman was connected to all three facilities which the Company acquired at a massive markup from an undisclosed related party, a clear violation of Hong Kong securities rules. In our view, these transactions either represent a naked transfer of wealth to the Chairman or are fake capital expenditures designed to mask fabricated profits.
- 4. SAIC Filings Suggest Fabricated Financial Statements for Major Acquisition. In April 2014, CTEG acquired Qingyuan Lvyou Environmental Protection Technology Company Limited ("Qingyuan Lvyou"), a company engaged in sludge and solid waste treatment, for RMB 125 million. The Company disclosed that Qingyuan Lvyou generated a loss in 2012 and net profits of RMB 11.9 million in 2013. Post-acquisition, the Company stated that Qingyuan Lvyou's profitability skyrocketed, generating net profit of HKD 80 million in 2014. However, Qingyuan Lvyou SAIC filings reveal that it generated a net loss of RMB 13.8 million in 2013, and only generated a net profit of RMB 27.2 million in 2014, 82% less than the aggregate profits reported to investors in those two years.
- 5. Entrusted Operations: Undisclosed Related Party Revenues. In 2015, CTEG reported a mysterious new source of revenue which it labelled "entrusted operation services." According to CTEG, this segment reported an EBITDA margin of 99.7% and accounted for 16% of the Company's total FY 2015 EBITDA. Yet SAIC filings reveal that 49% of the revenue from "entrusted operation services" came from six entities which are ultimately owned by Guangzhou Yingzhou, the undisclosed related party which we believe is secretly connected to the Chairman. Given that the Company reports an inexplicable 99.7% EBITDA margin in this segment, that it failed to disclose such related party relationships calls into question the authenticity of such reported profits.
- 6. Questionable Idle Land Purchase. On November 25, 2013, Xintao successfully won land use rights at an auction for RMB 44 million. As a condition for purchasing the land, construction had to begin within 12 months after signing and construction had to be completed within 36 months after signing. Yet a Baidu map and site visit reveal that nearly three years after the signing date, Xintao has not begun construction on the property. Why would the Company take on debt to spend RMB 44 million in cash for a property that sits idle in violation of the land purchase contract?
- 7. Incredible Profitability at Odds with Serial Capital Raising. Wastewater treatment in China is a crowded and commoditized space, heavily regulated by the Chinese government. We would not expect a business like CTEG, without a technological advantage over its peers, to report financial performance which significantly deviates from its competitors. Yet in 2015, CTEG's reported return-on-capital and net income margins figures were 127% and 108% greater, respectively, than an average of other Chinese wastewater treatment and disposal companies. This simply defies credibility. It is even more suspicious that despite such record profitability (net income margins between 33-46%), CTEG is still a serial capital raiser. CTEG's supposed profitability has been squandered on capital expenditures and acquisitions of questionable authenticity, and since 2008, the Company has raised via equity and debt issuances a total of RMB 4.4 billion (RMB 3.5 billion since 2013). Like China Metal Recycling, despite supposedly generating consistent and world-beating profit margins which bear no resemblance to the economics of its competitors, CTEG repeatedly returns to the capital markets to raise money. In our experience, this is a tell-tale sign of fabricated financial statements.

#### VALUATION

In this report, we present publicly available evidence, which in our opinion, indicates that CTEG has significantly inflated the utilization rate of its primary BOO water treatment facilities. For its primary Xintao facility, the Company has claimed that it operates near 100% utilization. Yet MEP data indicates it operated at 54% utilization in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (the most recent year for which we have MEP data).

The BOO segment is the driver of CTEG's supposed superior profitability (relative to its peers) and the primary component in the sell-side valuation of the Company's stock. Yet the MEP data indicates such supposed profitability is a mirage. This makes sense given that the Company is a serial capital raiser despite its inexplicable financial performance.

Additional evidence suggests that the Company is violating Hong Kong securities rules and exaggerating its reported financial performance. SAIC filings indicate that the Company fabricated the financial performance of a recent acquisition. SAIC filings also indicate that several of the Company's recent acquisitions, which included mysterious payables on top of the reported aggregate consideration, were from an undisclosed related party.

When we consider the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the Company is materially misrepresenting its reported financial performance and that its management is so untrustworthy that CTEG is simply <u>uninvestable</u>.

But in an effort to be conservative, we prepared an estimated valuation. Based on the MEP data and other evidence presented in this report, we estimate that CTEG's actual revenues are at least 30% less than reported. We also believe, based on the evidence, that at best, CTEG is just another player in a crowded, commoditized space littered by thousands of other companies. Accordingly, in our valuation, we normalized the Company's EBIT margins to match its peers. Rather than using the Company's reported 52% EBIT margins (which we believe are fabricated), our valuation uses a blended average EBIT margin of 28% generated by other Chinese wastewater treatment and waste disposal companies in 2015.

Simply normalizing CTEG's EBIT margins implies a significant downside in the price of its shares. By applying a blended P/E ratio of its peers, and applying a 25% corruption discount, we value CTEG's shares at HKD 0.38 per share, an 82% downside from the current stock price.

P/E		
Company Name	Ticker	P/E (ttm)
Beijing Enterprise Water Group	371.HK	16.46
Kangda Int'l Environmental Gr	6136.HK	9.23
China Everbright Int'l	257.HK	17.81
Tianjin Capital Envir'l Prot Gr	1065.HK	14.25
Dongjiang Environmental	895.HK	26.09
Yunnan Water	6839.HK	12.93
	Average	16.13
CT Environmental - Implied Price	1363.HK	0.51
Corruption Discoun	t	25%
Glaucus Valuation	n	0.38
Current Price	e	2.14
% Downsid	e	-82%

Source: Bloomberg; Glaucus Estimates

But we believe that even this valuation is too generous to CTEG, given the evidence that the Company has materially deceived investors about its financial performance. In addition, CTEG's 1H 2016 debt balance has ballooned to RMB 2.3 billion. We believe that such debt levels are problematic if, as we believe, the Company is much less profitable than it claims. Ultimately, while we conservatively value CTEG's shares at HKD 0.38 per share, given its debt levels and the scale of misrepresentations to investors and regulators, there is a reasonable probability of further downside to the Company's shares.



#### INFLATION OF REPORTED WASTEWATER TREATMENT VOLUMES

CTEG's business model is to process wastewater into clean water and resell the reclaimed water to public or private users. This requires large initial capital expenditures to build treatment, processing and disposal facilities. Accordingly, companies in this space generate sustained profitability when their expensive facilities are operating at a high capacity utilization rate.

Wastewater treatment is a commoditized industry in which the Chinese government typically regulates pricing. It is also fiercely competitive, crowded with players undifferentiated by basic technologies. In China, by the end of 2014, there were 4,436 operating urban sewage treatment facilities with a total design capacity of 171 million cubic meters per day and real processing volume of 135 million cubic meters per day.<sup>1</sup>

Despite this difficult operating environment, CTEG has attracted investors with its industry-leading margins. The Company claims that its reported profitability is generated by its Build-Own-Operate ("BOO") business model. From 2010 through 2012, CTEG reported that its BOO segment generated 87% of the Company's total reported gross profits. Prices for wastewater processed by a BOO facility are not typically set by the Chinese government, allowing the Company to charge a higher price on its services. In theory, this could lead to higher profit margins if the Company's water treatment facilities operated at or near full capacity, as CTEG claims.

#### 1) XINTAO

CTEG's Guangzhou Xintao Industrial Park Treatment Facility ("Xintao") is a wastewater treatment plant and the Company's primary BOO facility during the pre-IPO track record period, with total design capacity for wastewater treatment of 100,000 m³ per day.

CTEG reported that the Xintao facility's wastewater treatment services accounted for 69% (RMB 486 million) of the Company's aggregate gross profits during the track record period from 2010 through 2012.

**Gross Profits** 

G- 000 000				
Figures in HK\$'000	2010	2011	2012	Cumulative
BOO projects gross profit	153,996	233,712	227,594	615,302
BOT projects gross profit	33,029	33,237	24,801	91,067
Total	187,025	266,949	252,395	706,369
BOO contribution to Gross Profits	82%	88%	90%	87%
BOT contribution to gross profits	18%	12%	10%	13%

Gross Profits Specific to Guangzhou				
Xintao WWT Services (incl. above in	122,478	184,926	178,553	485,957
BOO projects)				
As % of Total Gross Profit	65%	69%	71%	69%

Source: CTEG Prospectus, p. 8

During the track record period, the Company attracted investor interest by highlighting the success of its BOO model and specifically the superior financial performance of the Xintao wastewater treatment facility.

CTEG's wastewater treatment revenue generation is dependent on (i) the volume of water treated, and (ii) the average price of water treated. CTEG disclosed in its Global Offering that Xintao processed an average 97,364m³ of wastewater per day in 2012,³ achieving a 97.4% capacity utilization rate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201506/t20150609 303209.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Daiwa Initiation Report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> CTEG Global Offering, p. 4.

#### Wastewater Treatment Constructed Utilized Volume of Average daily Capacity capacity wastewater as of Total as of volume of treated for Designed December December wastewater the three financial 31, 2012<sup>(2)</sup> 31, 2012<sup>(3)</sup> Capacity treated for years ended (m<sup>3</sup> per (m<sup>3</sup> per (m<sup>3</sup> per Utilization year 2012 December 31, 2012 day) day) day) Rate<sup>(4)</sup> $(m^3)$ (m<sup>3</sup>)100,000 103,974 104%(6 97,364 28,743,338 (2010) 100,000 34,447,949 (2011) 35,635,380 (2012)

#### Guangzhou Xintao Volume of Wastewater Treated 2010 - 2012

Source: CTEG Prospectus, p. 4

We believe that this was a blatant lie.

Because wastewater treatment is a highly regulated business, the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection ("<u>MEP</u>") publishes an annual list on its website of the volume of wastewater processed at urban sewage treatment facilities around China.

On April 24, 2013, the MEP <u>announced</u> that in 2012 there were a total of 3,836 urban sewage treatment facilities in the PRC, with average daily treatment capacity of 116 million cubic meters.



Source: MEP Announcement April 24, 2013

This same announcement included a link to a detailed list of treatment facilities published by the MEP. Below is an excerpt from the 2012 MEP National Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities List which states that Xintao's average daily volume of treated wastewater was 54,400m³ in 2012.

#### **2012 MEP Facilities List**

List of Nationwide Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities - 2012

全国投运城镇污水处理设施清单(2012)

No.	Province	City	Project Name Major	r Processing Tech. (	perate since De	sign Capacity A	verage Processing Vo
序号	省份	市 (区、 地、州)	項 目 名 称	主体处理工艺	投运时间	设计处理能力 (万立方米/日)	平均处理水量 (万立方米/日)
2690	广东	广州市	从化水质净化厂	A <sup>2</sup> /0	2008年1月	1, 60	0. 92
2691	广东	广州市	广州开发区水质净化管理中心九龙水质净 化一厂	氧化沟	2010年6月	0. 50	0. 26
2692	广东	广州市	联合环境水处理 (广州南沙) 有限公司	MBR	2007年6月	0.60	0.20
2693	广东	广州市	广州发展新塘水务有限公司(旺隆污水处理厂)	卡鲁赛尔氧化沟	2006年8月	10.00	4.93
2694	广东	广州市	广州新滔水质净化有限公司	CEA0	2004年5月	10.00	5. 44
Con	andone C	and and and	Cuonanhau Vintea	CEAO	May 2004		

Guangdong Guangzhou Guangzhou Xintao CEAO May, 2004

Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201305/W020130508476747765965.pdf

This evidence directly contradicts the Company's claim that the Xintao facility treated an average daily volume of 97,364m<sup>3</sup> per day in 2012, and indicates that CTEG overstated its treated wastewater volume by 79% for that year.

The 2013 and 2014 MEP lists tell a similar story. CTEG told sell side analysts that Xintao operated at 99% and 100% in 2013 and 2014, respectively.<sup>4</sup> Yet both the 2013 and 2014 MEP lists state that Xintao's average daily volumes remained flat at 54,400m<sup>3</sup> in both years, implying that CTEG overstated Xintao treated volumes by 82% and 84% in 2013 and 2014, respectively.

#### 2013 MEP Facilities List

List of Nationwide Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities - 2013

全国投运城镇污水处理设施清单(2013)

No. Province City Project Name Major Processing Tech. Operate since... Design Capacity Average Processing Vol

序号	省份	市(区、地、州)	项目名称	主体处理工艺	投运时间	设计处理能力 (万立方米/日)	平均处理水量 (万立方米/日)
2848	广东	广州市	大坦沙污水处理厂	A <sup>4</sup> /O	1989年1月	Unite: 10000	cubic meter/ day
2849	广东	广州市	大沙地污水处理厂(广州市污水治理有限责任 公司)	改良A%O	2009年1月	20.00	13.05
2850	广东	广州市	竹料污水处理厂	改良AVO	2009年8月	3.00	1.51
2851	广东	广州市	广州新白云国际机场污水处理站	A/O	2004年8月	2.80	0.95
2852	广东	广州市	南沙污水处理厂	A²/O	2006年7月	10.00	4.39
2853	广东	广州市	广州开发区西区水质净化厂	活性污泥法	1999年1月	7.50	4.38
2854	广东	广州市	广州开发区水和水质净化厂	CASS	2009年3月	5.50	3.05
2855	广东	广州市	从化水质净化厂	A <sup>I</sup> /O	2008年1月	1.60	0.92
2856	广东	广州市	广州开发区水质净化管理中心九龙水质净化一 厂	氧化沟	2010年6月	0.50	0.26
2857	广东	广州市	东华工业区污水处理站	生物膜法	2007年6月	0.50	0.16
2858	广东	广州市	广州市番禺区东涌工业污水处理站	二級生化	1992年10月	3.00	0.83
2859	广东	广州市	联合环境水处理 (广州南沙) 有限公司	MBR	2007年6月	0.60	0.20
2860	广东	广州市	广州发展新塘水务有限公司(原旺隆污水处理 厂)	卡鲁塞尔氧化沟	2006年8月	10.00	5.38
2861	广东	广州市	广州新滔水质净化有限公司	二级生化	2004年5月	10.00	5.44

Guangdong Guangzhou Guangzhou Xintao

Two-stage biochemistry May, 2004

Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201404/W020140415399348916037.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Daiwa Initiation Report, p. 8

#### **2014 MEP Facilities List**

List of Nationwide Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities - 2014

全国投运城镇污水处理设施清单(2014)

Province City

Project Name

Major Processing Tech. Operate since...

Design Capacity Average Processing

序号	省份	市(区、地、州)	项目名称	主体处理工艺	投运时间		平均处理水量(万 立方米/日) bic meter/ day
3052	广东	广州市	广州市番禺区东涌工业污水处理站	二级生化	1992年10月	3.00	0.83
3053	广东	广州市	联合环境水处理(广州南沙)有限公司	MBR	2007年6月	0.60	0.20
3054	广东	广州市	广州发展新塘水务有限公司(原旺隆污水处理 厂)	卡鲁塞尔氧化沟	2006年8月	10.00	5.38
3055	uangdons	Guangzhou	G世新疆水质的大桥和B公司	Two-stage blochemist	ry <sup>2</sup> 99fá§5 <u>2</u> 004	10.00	5.44
3056	广东	广州市	石井污水处理厂	A²/O	2010年9月	15.00	8.52

Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201506/W020150609575919731164.pdf

The table below illustrates the discrepancy between the MEP data and the Company's reported average daily volume of wastewater treated at Xintao. On average, from 2012 through 2014, MEP data indicates that CTEG overstated its Xintao average daily volume treated by 82%.

MEP DATA - Daily Processing Volume for Xintao

	2012	2013	2014	AVERAGE
Reported Capacity per day (m³)	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
Utilization Rate	97%	99%	100%	99%
Implied Daily Production Volume (m³)	97,364	99,000	100,000	98,788
MEP Reported Annual Processing Volume (m³)	54,400	54,400	54,400	54,400
Difference (m³)	42,964	44,600	45,600	44,388
% Overstatement	79%	82%	84%	82%

Sources:

- 1. CTEG Prospectus
- 2. Daiwa Initiation Report, p. 8
- 3. 2012, 2013 and 2014 MEP Data

The MEP data on the actual wastewater treatment volumes at Xintao is corroborated by additional independent PRC government and industry websites. First, the Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau discloses that in the first nine months of 2014, the actual average daily volume of wastewater treated at Xintao was 51,000m<sup>3</sup>, a utilization rate of 51% and slightly below the 54% reported by the MEP for the entire calendar year of 2014.

1				2014 Jan-S	Sep Nationwide Key	Wastewater information	ation disclosure			
2				201/4年	1.0日全国	<b>能由式污水</b>	<b>外</b> 理厂信息公	. 开表		
3	<b>2014年1-9</b> 月全国集中式污水处理厂信息公开表 Designed Cap. Actual Processed Volume									
4				Designed Cap.						
5				设计处理规模	实际处理量	COD执行排放标准	COD监督性监测最大值	COD监督性监测平均值	氨氮执行排放标准	
43	37	广东省广州市增城市	高滩污水处理厂	0.3	0.25	40	35	21.36	5	
44	38	广东省广州市増城市	广州新滔水质净化有限公司	10	5.1	90	60	33.29	10	
45	39	广东省广州市増城市	永和污水处理厂	10	10.25	40	31.17	25.52	5	
46	40	广东省广州市増城市	石滩污水处理厂	5	2.46	40		24.71	5	
47	41	广东省广州市増城市	新塘污水处理厂	10	10	40	285	21.75	5	
48	42	广东省广州市增城市	增城荔城污水处理厂	5	10.111	40		25.25	8	
49	43	广东省广州市增城市	广州盈隆污水处理有限公司	10		90			10	
50	44	广东省广州市从化市	从化市温泉镇污水处理厂	1	0.33	40	21.3	15.3	8	
51	45	广东省广州市从化市	从化市太平镇污水处理厂	2	0.81	40	33.6	28.3	8	
52	46	广东省广州市从化市	从化市良口镇污水处理厂	1.1	0.24	40	28	22.3	8	
53	47	广东省广州市从化市	从化市中心城区生活污水处理厂	5	2.29	40	30	28.6	8	

Source: Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau

Additionally, an article published in 2014 by Dowater, an industry website, states that Xintao's average daily volume of treated wastewater was 54,400m3.

# 州新滔水质净化有限公司

Guangzhou Xintao

http://www.dowater.com 时间: 2014-9-24 中国污水处理工程网



Guangzhou Xintao is a subsidiary of CT Environmental Group. It locates in Guangzhou, with a daily design capacity of 100,000 cubic meter.

"州新滔水质净化有限公司隶属于中滔环保集团,坐落于广东广州市,设计处理能力为 日处理污水10.00万立方米。主要建设内容包括厂区土建施工,工艺设备、工艺管道安 装, 电气、自控系统安装, 照明, 防雷接地, 采暖, 通风, 厂区道路施工及绿化等。广 Avg. volume of treated water is 54,400 m³ per day :入运行以来,污水处理设备运转良好,日 平均处理污水量为5.44 万立方米。该项目采用先进的污水处理设备,厂区主体工艺采用 二级生化处理工艺。广州新滔水质净化有限公司建成后极大地改善了城市水环境,对治 理污染,保护当地流域水质和生态平衡具有十分重要的作用,同时对改善广州市的投资 环境,实现广州市经济社会可持续发展具有积极的推进作用。

Source: Dowater.com September 24, 2014 article

These two independent sources, one a government website and the other an industry website, corroborate the MEP data and indicate that Xintao's actual utilization rate was less than 55% in 2013 and 2014. This data directly contradicts the Company's reported utilization rate for the Xintao facility in those years.

#### 2) Yinglong

MEP data shows a similar exaggeration of wastewater treatment volumes at Guangzhou Yinglong Wastewater Treatment Company Limited ("Yinglong"), another wastewater treatment facility operated by CTEG using the BOO model.

The Yinglong facility was acquired in 2012 by CTEG, and in the MEP lists it is referred to by its former name, Guangzhou Development Xintang Water Service Company Limited ("Xintang Water"). As disclosed in the Company's Global Offering, CTEG acquired the facility from Xintang Water in 2012.

#### HISTORY AND REORGANIZATION


Pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement, Guangzhou Xintao, Xintang Environmental and Mr. Lu agreed to form a project company to be owned by them as to 46%, 49% and 5%, respectively, for the purpose of bidding for the Yinglong Project and ultimately owning the Yinglong Project. As the project company had not been formed at the time of the tender process, the parties agreed to bid for the Yinglong Project using Guangzhou Xintao to participate in the tender process for the Yinglong Project on behalf of the project company. Pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement, if Guangzhou Xintao wins the bid for the Yinglong Project, it shall transfer the Yinglong Project to the project company.

On November 2, 2011, Guangzhou Xintao successfully won the bid for the Yinglong Project for a total consideration of RMB222.6 million, and on November 15, 2011, Guangzhou Xintao entered into a wastewater treatment project transfer agreement (the "Project Agreement") with Xintang Water. Pursuant to the Project Agreement, Guangzhou Xintao is required, within nine months after taking over the Yinglong Project, to commence operating phase two of the Yinglong Project with a designed capacity of 150,000 m<sup>3</sup> and to comply with the relevant municipal, provincial and national compliance standards. Completion of the transfer of the Yinglong Project from Xintang Water was conditional upon satisfaction of certain conditions precedent. Before completing the transfer in March 2012, the Yinglong Project was owned and operated by Xintang Water.

On March 1, 2012, the transfer of the Yinglong Project by Xintang Water to Guangzhou Xintao was completed after satisfaction of the conditions precedent. On the same date, Guangzhou Xintao

Source: CTEG Prospectus, p. 102

CTEG disclosed in its Global Offering that Yinglong processed an average 72,681m³ of wastewater per day in 2012.



Source: CTEG Prospectus, p. 4

However, the <u>2012 MEP list</u> states that Yinglong's average daily volume of treated wastewater was only 49,300m<sup>3</sup>. This directly contradicts the Company's reported utilization rate for this facility and indicates that CTEG exaggerated the volume of wastewater treated by the Yinglong facility by 47%. Note that MEP lists refer to Yinglong by its previous name, Xintang Water.

#### **2012 MEP Facilities List**

List of Nationwide Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities - 2012

全国投运城镇污水处理设施清单(2012)

No.	Province	City	Project Name Majo	r Processing Tech. (	Operate Since	Design Capacity A	Average Processing
序号	省份	市(区、地、州)	项 目 名 称	主体处理工艺	投运时间	设计处理能力 (万立方米/日)	平均处理水量 (万立方米/日)
2690	广东	广州市	从化水质净化厂	A <sup>2</sup> /0	2008年1月	1. 60	o. 92
2691	广东	广州市	广州开发区水质净化管理中心九龙水质净 化一厂	氧化沟	2010年6月	0. 50	0. 26
2692	广东	广州市	联合环境水处理 (广州南沙) 有限公司	MBR	2007年6月	0.60	0. 20
2693 Gu	广 东 angdong	广州市 Guangzhou	广州发展新塘水务有限公司(旺隆污水处 深intang Water (Wanglong Water) Carrot	卡鲁赛尔氧化沟 isel Oxidation Ditch	2006年8月 August, 2006	10.00	4. 93
2694	广东	广州市	广州新滔水质净化有限公司	CEAO	2004年5月	10.00	5. 44

Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201305/W020130508476747765965.pdf

Subsequently, the Company disclosed to sell-side analysts that Yinglong's capacity utilization was 80% and 90% in 2013 and 2014, respectively.<sup>5</sup> However, the 2013 MEP list and 2014 MEP list reveal that Yinglong's average daily volumes remained flat at 53,800m³ in both years, implying that CTEG overstated the volume of wastewater treated by Yinglong by 49% and 67% in 2013 and 2014, respectively.

#### **2013 MEP Facilities List**

List of Nationwide Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities - 2013

全国投运城镇污水处理设施清单(2013)

No.	Province	City	Project Name	Major Processing Tech. (	Operate since	Design Capacity	Avg Processing
序号	省份	市(区、地、州)	项目名称	主体处理工艺	投运时间	设计处理能力 (万立方米/日)	平均处理水量 (万立方米/日)
2848	广东	广州市	大坦沙污水处理厂	A <sup>1</sup> /O	1989年1月	Unite: *0000	ubic meter/ day
2849	广东	广州市	大沙地污水处理厂(广州市污水治理有限责任 公司)	E 改良A//O	2009年1月	20.00	13.05
2850	广东	广州市	竹科污水处理厂	改良A%0	2009年8月	3.00	1.51
2851	广东	广州市	广州新白云国际机场污水处理站	A/O	2004年8月	2.80	0.95
2852	广东	广州市	南沙污水处理厂	A <sup>1</sup> /O	2006年7月	10.00	4.39
2853	广东	广州市	广州开发区西区水质净化厂	活性污泥法	1999年1月	7.50	4.38
2854	广东	广州市	广州开发区水和水质净化厂	CASS	2009年3月	5.50	3.05
2855	广东	广州市	从化水质净化厂	A <sup>1</sup> /O	2008年1月	1.60	0.92
2856	广东	广州市	广州开发区水质净化管理中心九龙水质净化- 广	氧化沟	2010年6月	0.50	0.26
2857	广东	广州市	东华工业区污水处理站	生物模法	2007年6月	0.50	0.16
2858	广东	广州市	广州市番禺区东涌工业污水处理站	二级生化	1992年10月	3.00	0.83
2859	广东	广州市	联合环境水处理 (广州南沙) 有限公司	MBR	2007年6月	0.60	0.20
2860	广东	广州市	广州发展新塘水务有限公司(原旺隆污水处理 厂)	· 卡鲁塞尔氧化沟	2006年8月	10.00	5.38
2861	广东	广州市	广州新道水质净化有限公司	二級生化	2004年5月	10.00	5.44

Guangdong Guangzhou Xintang Water (Wanglong Water) Carrousel Oxidation Ditch August, 2006

Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201404/W020140415399348916037.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Daiwa Initiation Report, p. 8; ICBC Initiation Report, p. 12.

#### **2014 MEP Facilities List**

List of Nationwide Urban Sewage Treatment Facilities - 2014

全国投运城镇污水处理设施清单(2014)

Province City

Project Name

Major Processing Tech. Operate since... Design Capacity Avg. Processing Vol

序号	省份	市(区、地、州)	项目名称	主体处理工艺	投运时间	设计处理能力 (万立方米/日) Unite: 0000 cu	平均处理水量(万 立方米/日) bic meter/ day
3052	广东	广州市	广州市番禺区东涌工业污水处理站	二級生化	1992年10月	3.00	0.83
3053	广东	广州市	联合环境水处理 (广州南沙) 有限公司	MBR	2007年6月	0.60	0.20
3054Gu	angdong	Guangzhou X	广州发展新塘水务有限公司(原旺隆污水处理 intang Water (Wanglong Water) Carrou	sel Ozidañon Dirich A	ugust, 2006年8月	10.00	5.38
3055	广东	广州市	广州新滔水质净化有限公司	二級生化	2004年5月	10.00	5.44
3056	广东	广州市	石井污水处理厂	A²/O	2010年9月	15.00	8.52

Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/201506/W020150609575919731164.pdf

The table below illustrates the discrepancy between the Company's claims and the MEP data regarding the average daily volume of waste water treated at Yinglong. On average, from 2012 through 2014, this data indicates that CTEG overstated its Yinglong average daily volume treated by 54%.

MEP DATA - Daily Processing Volume for Yinglong

	0			
	2012	2013	2014	AVERAGE
Reported Capacity per day (m³)	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
Utilization Rate	73%	80%	90%	81%
Implied Daily Production Volume (m³)	72,681	80,000	90,000	80,894
MEP Reported Annual Processing Volume (m³)	49,300	53,800	53,800	52,300
Difference (m³)	23,381	26,200	36,200	28,594
% Overstatement	47%	49%	67%	54%

Sources:

- 1. CTEG Prospectus
- 2. Daiwa Initiation Report, ICBC
- 3. 2012, 2013 and 2014 MEP Data

Like Xintao, the MEP data for Yinglong is corroborated by an independent source. In this case, an article on the industry website Dowater.com, published in September 2014, confirms that the average daily volume of water treated at the Yinglong (again referred to by its previous name Xintang Water) was 53,800 cubic meters per day.

Xintang Water

http://www.dowater.com

时间: 2014-9-24

中国污水处理工程网



Xintang Water locates in Guangzhou, with a daily design capacity of 100,000 cubic meter

一州发展新塘水务有限公司(旺隆污水处理厂),坐落于广东广州市,设计处理能力为日 处理污水10.00万立方米。主要建设内容包括厂区土建施工,工艺设备、工艺管道安

Xintang Water operated since Aug 2006 and its average daily treated volume is 53,800 cubic meter

州发展新塘水务有限公司(旺隆污水处理厂)自2006年8月正式投入运行以来,污水处理 设备运转良好,日平均处理污水量为5.38 万立方米。该项目采用先进的污水处理设

备,厂区主体工艺采用卡鲁赛尔氧化沟处理工艺。广州发展新塘水务有限公司(旺隆污 水处理厂)建成后极大地改善了城市水环境,对治理污染,保护当地流域水质和生态平 衡具有十分重要的作用,同时对改善广州市的投资环境,实现广州市经济社会可持续发 展具有积极的推进作用。

Source: Dowater.com September 24, 2014 article

This industry source stated that Yinglong was operating at 54% capacity, well below the 80-90% capacity claimed by the Company.

In examining the credibility of the MEP data, we compared other publicly listed companies and found that overall, the MEP data tracked the claimed utilization of their facilities.<sup>6</sup>

First, we examined Hong Kong listed Beijing Enterprises Water Group Limited (HK 0371) ("Beijing Water"). We compared Beijing Water's claimed utilization rate for its PRC based wastewater treatment facilities with the utilization rates from the MEP data. The MEP data matched Beijing Water's claims, almost perfectly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> MEP data was not available for all of Beijing Water's or Kangda's facilities, so we compared the claimed overall utilization rates with the MEP utilization rates for facilities for which data was available. In the case of Beijing Water, this represented roughly half of its overall capacity and its major facilities, so we believe that the MEP data was sufficient to give a representative sample to measure Beijing Water's overall utilization rate. For Kangda, we likewise found MEP data for roughly 55% of its facilities, including its major projects, which we believe is a sufficient number to analyze Kangda's claimed utilization rates against the data set.

MEP DATA - Daily Processing Volume for Beijing Enterprises Water Gr

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Average
Company Reported Utilization Rate	67%	68%	71%	82%	72%
MEP Utilization Rate		67%	79%	84%	72%
Difference	7%	1%	-8%	-2%	-1%
% Overstatement	12%	1%	-11%	-2%	-1%

Source: 2011-2014 MEP data, company filings

We found the same pattern with respect to Kangda International Environmental Co Ltd (HK: 6136), another Hong Kong listed wastewater treatment company ("Kangda"). Data was only available for comparison in 2012 and 2013, during Kangda's track record period. But the MEP data matched the utilization rates claimed in Kangda's public offering.

MEP DATA - Daily Processing Volume for Kangda Int'l Environmental Gr

	2012	2013	Average
Company Reported Utilization Rate	97%	98%	97%
MEP Utilization Rate	94%	95%	95%
Difference	2%	3%	2%
% Overstatement	2%	3%	2%

Source: 2012-2013 MEP data, company filings

MEP data largely conforms to the utilization rates reported by two other Hong Kong companies, Beijing Water and Kangda, increasing our conviction in the accuracy of the data set.

#### 3) Profit Overstatement

MEP data indicates that the Company significantly overstated the utilization rates and therefore the volume of wastewater processed at its two key BOO facilities. Because CTEG's wastewater treatment segment from its BOO facilities is the Company's **primary driver of profitability**, the impact of the Company's misrepresentations is severe.

Using the utilization rates from the MEP data and average estimated tariffs obtained from sell side analysts, we have estimated what we believe to be the amount of revenues overstated by the Company at each of its key facilities. We calculate that the Company overstated its Xintao facility revenue by RMB 268 million between 2012-2014, and overstated Yinglong facility revenues by RMB 128 million over that same period.

Revenue Overstatement - Xintao

RMB'000	2012	2013	2014	Total
Reported Capacity per day (m³)	100,000	100,000	100,000	300,000
Utilization Rate	97%	99%	100%	99%
Implied Daily Production Volume (m³)	97,368	99,000	100,000	296,368
MEP Reported Annual Processing Volume (m³)	54,400	54,400	54,400	163,200
Δ Volume (m³)	42,968	44,600	45,600	133,168
Average Tariff (RMB)	5.2	5.5	5.8	5.5
Δ Revenue/year	81,553	89,535	96,535	267,623

Source: CTEG Prospectus, Daiwa Initiation Report, 2012-2014 MEP data, Glaucus estimates

Revenue Overstatement - Yinglong

RMB'000	2012	2013	2014	Total
Reported Capacity per day (m³)	100,000	100,000	100,000	300,000
Utilization Rate	73%	80%	90%	81%
Implied Daily Production Volume (m³)	72,681	80,000	90,000	242,681
MEP Reported Annual Processing Volume (m³)	49,300	53,800	53,800	156,900
Δ Volume (m³)	23,381	26,200	36,200	85,781
Average Tariff (RMB)	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1
Δ Revenue/year	34,136	39,208	54,173	127,518

Source: CTEG Prospectus, Daiwa Initiation Report, 2012-2014 MEP data, Glaucus estimates

Based on these estimated tariff rates and the MEP data, we calculate that the Company's actual BOO revenue was 52% less than reported from 2012-2014.<sup>7</sup>

#### **Estimated Overstatement of Revenues in BOO Segment**

RMB'000	2012	2013	2014	Total
Total Revenue	312,204	384,307	818,116	1,514,627
BOO Revenue	197,452	211,929	353,084	762,466
Glaucus Estimated BOO Revenue Based on MEP Data	81,763	83,187	202,376	367,325
% Difference	-59%	-61%	-43%	-52%

Source: Company Filings, CTEG Prospectus, p. 8, Guosen Securities, 2012-2014 MEP data, Glaucus estimates

Simply estimating the overstated revenue does not capture the extent to which we believe that the Company has misrepresented its financial performance. The Company's BOO sector was responsible for 64% of CTEG's reported gross profit from 2012 through 2014.

To estimate how much of CTEG's profits were overstated at its key BOO facilities, we make a key assumption. We assume that the Company reported accurate COGS and that the fabricated revenues were added directly to reported gross profits. Based on our assumption, we estimate that CTEG's gross profit from its BOO segment was 67% less than reported for that segment from 2012-2014.

#### **Estimated Overstatement of Gross Profit**

RMB'000	2012	2013	2014	Total
Total Gross Profit	205,309	242,642	461,290	909,241
BOO Gross Profit	151,834	162,974	271,522	586,330
Glaucus Estimated BOO Gross Profit Based on MEP Data	36,145	34,231	120,813	191,189
% Difference	-76%	-79%	-56%	-67%

Source: Company Filings, CTEG Prospectus, p. 8, Guosen Securities, 2012-2014 MEP data, Glaucus estimates

Ultimately, we believe that the MEP data clearly indicates that the Company overstated the volume of wastewater treated at its key BOO facilities and that as such, CTEG's gross profits were significantly overstated.

14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> We exclude 2015 from this analysis because we do not have MEP data for this year, but we believe that the Company continued to materially misrepresent the performance of its BOO business in these years.


#### **DEN OF THIEVES**

On January 28, 2013, Glaucus released a report alerting the market that according to MEP data (the same source as the data presented in this report), Hong Kong listed China Metal Recycling (HK: 0773) ("CMR") was a blatant fraud that was fabricating its reported revenues and profits.

In an unprecedented step, on July 29, 2013, the Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") moved to force CMR into liquidation. Hong Kong courts agreed, saying that there was "compelling evidence" that CMR had engaged in "industrial scale fraud." On August 12, 2013, Bloomberg reported that Hong Kong police arrested the CMR Chairman along with his wife and two other officers of the disgraced company.


CMR was one of the most blatant and aggressive frauds in Hong Kong history. Imagine our surprise when we discovered evidence that CMR's Chairman, Chun Chi-Wai, was intimately involved in the formation of CTEG.

Xi Zhou Enterprises (Hong Kong) ("Xi Zhou") is a Company subsidiary which serves as the Hong Kong holding company for all CTEG's PRC subsidiaries. It is obviously a significant entity within CTEG's corporate structure. We can safely infer that the actions of Xi Zhou are ultimately directed by Chairman Tsui Cham To ("Chairman Tsui").



Source: CTEG Prospectus, p. 106

SAIC filings reveal that Mr. Chun Chi-Wai ("Mr. Chun"), the disgraced former Chairman of CMR, was appointed by Xi Zhou as a founding board member of CTEG's critical PRC subsidiary, Xintao.



Source: Xintao SAIC Filings

Similarly, Mr. Chun was also the founding member of another CTEG PRC subsidiary, Guangzhou Kaizhou ("Kaizhou").



Source: Guangzhou Kaizhou SAIC Filings

The relationship appears to be so intimate that CTEG's Chairman Tsui was mentioned in CMR's Global Offering as Mr. Chun's business partner. The listing document also discloses that Chairman Tsui purchased assets from CMR as part of CMR's reorganization during its pre-IPO period.

the Track Record Period, Asia Wing Tat was principally engaged in the trading of scrap metals, and it has ceased its operation and became inactive after we disposed of our interest in Asia Huan Bao. Longmen had no active business during the Track Record Period. As Asia Huan Bao, Asia Wing Tat and Longmen had insignificant profit contribution to our Group during the Track Record Period, Asia Huan Bao (being the holding company of Asia Wing Tat) and Longmen were respectively disposed of to Mr. Chun Chi-wai and To Kee Holdings Limited (a company wholly owned by Mr. Tsui Cham To ("Mr. Tsui")) in December 2006 and June 2007, respectively as part of the Reorganisation.

During the Track Record Period, Mr. Tsui was (i) a business partner of Mr. Chun Chi-wai, (ii) a shareholder of Huan Bao Steel holding approximately 0.01% interest in Huan Bao Steel which was subsequently transferred to Asia Steel (H.K.) on 5 August 2005 and (iii) a shareholder of Asia Steel (Holdings) holding 48% interest in Asia Steel (Holdings) which was subsequently transferred to Mr. Chun Chi-wai on 29 June 2007. Prior to leaving our Group, Mr. Tsui held various non-executive directorships in Guangzhou Asia Steel, Yangzhong Yagang, Central Steel Macau, Huan Bao Steel and Guangzhou Zhujiang Port. Mr. Tsui ceased all such directorships in August 2007 and did not hold any executive positions in our Group during the Track Record Period.

Source: China Metal Recycling Prospectus, p. 94

Such records suggest that CMR's disgraced chairman was intimately involved in the construction of CTEG and that CTEG's Chairman Tsui maintained close ties with a blatant stock fraudster. Such intimacy with a man arrested for orchestrating one of Hong Kong's most notorious stock frauds is a major red flag for investors. In our opinion, this relationship bolsters the credibility of the evidence in this report that CTEG is similarly misrepresenting its financial performance to investors.

#### INFLATED PURCHASE PRICES FOR UNDISCLOSED RELATED PARTY ACQUISITIONS

In 2015, CTEG acquired 100% equity interests in three facilities for a total aggregate consideration of RMB 276 million. CTEG claimed that in each case, the beneficial owners of the acquired entities were independent third parties. We believe that this is a lie. SAIC filings reveal that each of the three entities was owned by **an undisclosed related party secretly connected to CTEG's Chairman**.

Worse still, <u>SAIC filings show that undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired all three entities</u> <u>for just RMB 46 million one year before flipping them to CTEG at a 6x markup</u>. Records indicate that Guangzhou Yingzhou was incorporated only weeks before the first transaction, which to us indicates that the entity was formed simply to serve as a related party middleman to mark up the value of acquired facilities.

Put simply, the records indicate that CTEG's Chairman was connected to all three facilities which the Company acquired at a massive markup from an undisclosed related party, a clear violation of Hong Kong securities rules. In our view, these transactions either represent a naked transfer of wealth to the Chairman or are fake capital expenditures designed to mask fabricated profits.

#### a. Ganghui Huanbao Acquisition.

In November 2015, CTEG subsidiary Xintao acquired 100% equity interest in Ganghui Environmental Sewage Treatment Co. Ltd. (also known as Foshan Shunde Ganghui Wastewater Treatment Company) ("Ganghui Huanbao"), for a total consideration of **RMB 73 million**. In public filings, CTEG's <u>claimed</u> that all Ganghui Huanbao's ultimate beneficial owners were independent third parties.

Principal terms of the two agreements are set out below:

#### THE SHUNDE ASSET OPERATION AGREEMENT

Date: 23 September 2014

Parties: (i) Guangzhou Xintao, a subsidiary of the Group; and

(ii) Ganghui Environmental which together with its ultimate beneficial owner(s), to the best of the knowledge, information and belief of the Directors and after making all reasonable enquiries, are third parties independent of the Company and its connected persons.

Source: http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2014/0924/LTN20140924183.pdf

We believe that this is a lie. Below is a screenshot from the SAIC website which discloses that Company subsidiary Xintao is the current shareholder of Ganghui Huanbao.



佛山市顺德区港汇环保污水处理有限公司

Shareholder Info (after	amendment
Shareholder Name 股东信息(变更)	后)
股东名称	证照号
广州新滔水质净化有限公司 Guangzhou Xintao	91 44***********************************

Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index


However, shareholder history available in the amendment history section of Ganghui Huanbao's SAIC filings reveal that the Company purchased Ganghui Huanbao from Guangzhou Yingzhou Investment Co. Ltd. ("Guangzhou Yingzhou").

		Amer	ndment				
	变更信息						
	变更事项	变更前内容	变更后内容	变更日期			
其他	法人股东 Institutional Sharehol	查看变更前资料	查看变更后资料 View details after amendment	2016年01月04日			
部	法人股东	查看变更前资料	查看变更后资料	2014年09月19日			
ľΊ	法定代表人	苏德强	刘光辉	2014年09月19日			

Shareholder Informat  Bhareholder Name  Shareholder Name	ion After Amendment (变更后) License Number
股东名称	证照号
广州盈洲投资有限公司	4401************

Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index

Guangzhou Yingzhou is the key to understanding the related party connections between the Chairman and CTEG's recent acquisitions. SAIC filings indicate that Guangzhou Yingzhou was only incorporated on July 29, 2014, just a few weeks before it acquired Ganghui Huanbao.



Source: Guangzhou Yingzhou SAIC Filings

SAIC filings reveal that the nominal shareholders of Guangzhou Yingzhou are two individuals, Mr. Shuiman Wu and Mr. Guanghui Liu.



Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index

Mr. Guanghui Liu is listed as the board supervisor of Guangzhou Xintao Credit Guarantee Company ("<u>Xintao Credit</u>"), which is owned by CTEG's Chairman and his cousin. Records indicate that CTEG's Chairman Tsui was Xintao Credit's legal representative.



Source: <a href="http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index">http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index</a>

SAIC filings also reveal that a shareholder of Xintao Credit is Guangzhou To Kee Enterprises Development Group Limited (<u>To Kee Enterprises</u>"), an entity owned by CTEG's Chairman and his cousin.

As at the date of the Acquisition Agreement, Guangzhou To Kee is owned as to 89.63% by Mr. Tsui Cham To, an executive Director. Guangzhou To Kee is therefore a connected person of the Company and the acquisition of the Target Company by the Group constituted a connected transaction for the Company. As all the applicable percentage ratios (as defined in the Listing Rules) in respect of the acquisition is less than 5%, the acquisition was only subject to the reporting and announcement requirements and was exempt from the circular, independent financial advice and independent shareholders' approval requirements under Chapter 14A of the Listing Rules.

Source: 2015 company filings, p 53

登i	记信息 备	案信息	动产抵	押登记信息	股权出质登记信息	行政处罚信	息经营异常	信息严	重违法失信信息	抽查检查信息
Unif	fied Socia	l Credit	Identifi	er		基本	恴			
	统	一社会信	用代码	9144010175199	911678				Guangzhou Xii	ntao Credit Guarantee Company
Reg	gistration 1	Number	注册号	4401010000749	900		Company N	lame	名称 广州市信滔	* *
			类型	其他有限责任公	公司		Legal Rep	法定任	<b>代表人</b> 郑睿 Rui .	Zheng
Regis	stration Ca	apital 注	册资本	10000万 100	M RMB	1	ncorporation	Date成立	<b>达日期</b> 2003年07月	09日 07/09/2003
		经	营场所	广州市増城新城	唐镇港口大道321号A幢17	层				
Oper	rating Sin	ce 营业	期限自	2003年07月09日	∃ 07/09/2003	C	Operating Unt	il 营业期	明限至 长期 Long	g-term
Ор	perating S	cope 经	营范围		会性担保除外):企业财务 的项目,经相关部门批》			商品信息咨	容询服务:投资管理服	务:投资咨询服务:
Regis	stration B	ureau <u>脅</u>	记机关	广州市工商行政 Administrati	政管理局 on for Industry and	Commerce			<b>推日期</b> 2016年03月	09日 3/9/2016
Regis	stration St	atus <u> </u>	记状态	存续 On-goir	on for Industry and ng	Commerce	or zhong onu			

股. Shareholder Type	东的出资信息截止2014年2月28日。3 Shareholder	Shareholder Information 股东信息 2014年2月28日之后工商只公示股东姓名,其 License Type	他出资信息由企业自行公示。 License Number	Details
股东类型	股东	证照/证件类型	证照/证件号码	详情
Institutional Shareholder 法人股东	广州市滔记实业发展集团有限公 <mark>(</mark> 司	Buangzhou To Kee Enterprises Devo	lopment Group Limited	详情
自然人股东	梁淦奎		不公示 N/A	详情
法人股东	广州荔新投资有限公司			详情
Individual Shareholder 自然人股东	徐炬文 Juwen Xu		不公示 N/A	详情

Source: <a href="http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index">http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index</a>

In another direct connection, SAIC filings reveal that To Kee Enterprises, owned by CTEG's Chairman, is the landlord of Guangzhou Yingzhou.

#### Lease Agreement

## 场地租赁协议书



Guangzhou To

Kee Enterprises Development Group

First Party 甲方: 广州滔记实业发展集团有限公司 Guangzhou To Kee Enterprises Development Group Second Party 乙方: 刘光辉 Guanghui Liu

> 甲方提供位于增城市新塘镇牛仔路 173 号的商铺租赁给乙方使用,现 双方就有关租赁事宜达成如下协议,望双方共同信守。 To Kee Enterprises leases a commercial real estate at Cowboy Road 173, Xintang to Guanghui Liu

- 租用期从 2014 年 7 月 15 日至 2019 年 6 月 30 日止, 为期五年, 租金为每年人民币柒仟贰佰元正。Leasing term (5 year) starts from 07/15/2014 to 06/30/2019 with annual rental payment of RMB 7,200
- 乙方租赁场地经营项目由工商部门核定,有关合法开业手续由乙 方自行到有关部门办理,所涉及的税费由乙方支付,与甲方无关。
- 乙方应于签订合同后一次性缴纳第一年租金,以后每年6月30 日前一次性交付下一年度租金给甲方。逾期未交清部分按每天千之 五计收滞纳金。
- 乙方租赁期间所产生的一切费用及所发生的一切经营问题由乙 方负责,与甲方无关。
- 本协议未尽事宜,双方本着友好协作原则协商解决。本协议一式 两份, 甲乙双方各执一份, 自签订之日起生效。


Signature

此复写件与原件相符

签订日期:二0一四年七月十五日 07/15/2014

Source: Guangzhou Yingzhou SAIC filings

Chairman Tsui is an owner of two shell companies. The first, Xintao Credit, employs Guangzhou Yingzhou's shareholder as a board supervisor. The second, To Kee Enterprises, is Guangzhou Yingzhou's landlord. The connection is clear. Below, we prepared a structure chart showing the links between the Chairman, Guangzhou Yingzhou and the facility acquired by the Company.



Guangzhou Yingzhou's landlord, To Kee Enterprises, is an entity 89% owned by CTEG's Chairman Tsui. Its shareholder is the board supervisor of a different entity owned and controlled by CTEG's Chairman and his cousin. Accordingly, we believe that Guangzhou Yingzhou is clearly a connected party.

We believe that the Company concealed this information because records indicate that CTEG inflated the purchase price of Ganghui Huanbao and the other entities acquired from undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou.

CTEG reported that the total acquisition consideration for Ganghui Huanbao was RMB 73 million. Because CTEG inherited the entity's RMB 149 million in payables to an unnamed party, the true cost of acquisition was RMB 222 million!

v)	Ganghui Huanbao	(v) 3	<b>養匯環保</b>			
		977		Carlo Sales Sales Sales Sales		
	The principal activities of Gangh			<b>芭</b> 匯環保之主要		
,	of wastewater treatment se			國提供污水處理		
П	November 2015, the Group acqui		665	4	第一五年十一月	・本集圏
П	in Ganghui Huanbao for	f	f	七價人民幣25,00	00,000元收	
- [	RMB25,000,000. The acquisition	Ä	医匯環保100%形	本權益。		
	business combination.		1ģ	<b>枚購被視為業務</b>	合併。	
	The following summarizes the	nature of consideratio	n	į.	以下概述所轉撥	的代價之
	transferred, and the recognis				質・以及於收購	
	acquired and liabilities assumed		資產及所承擔負			
	ordanica ana marinica assanica	or the designation date.		3	Recognise	
				Carrying amount	Fair value adjustments	values acquisiti 收購
				医面值	公平值調整	確認
			Note	RMB'000	RMB'000	RMB'0
			附註	人民幣千元	人民幣千元	人民幣干
	Property, plant and equipment	物業·廠房及設備		128,872		128,8
	Construction in progress	在建工程		918	-	9
	Lease prepayments	租賃預付款項	11	5,026	4,974 16,000	10,0 16,0
	Intangible assets Inventories	無形資產存貨	11	174	16,000	16,0
	Trade and other receivables	貿易及其他應收款項		63.723	<u> </u>	63.7
	Cash and cash equivalents	现金及现金等價物		2.241	_	2.2
	Trade and other payables	貿易及其他應付款項		(148,615)		(148,6
	Deferred tax liabilities	遞延税項負債		=	(5,244)	(5,2
	Net identifiable assets	可識別資產淨值		52,339	15,730	68,0
	Cash consideration	現金代價				25,0
	Settlement of pre-existing relationship	前期合作關係終止				47,9
	Total consideration	總代價				72,9
	Goodwill	商譽	12			4,8
	Analysis of cash flow:	現金流量分析:				
	Cash consideration	現金代價				25,0
	Less: cash acquired	滅:所收購現金				(2,2
	Net cash outflow for acquisition of Ganghui Huanbao for the year	截至二零一五年 十二月三十一日止				
	ended 31 December 2015	年度收購港匯環保				
		之現金流出淨值				22.7

Source: CTEG 2015 Annual Report, p. 124

SAIC filings suggest that this price was significantly inflated. First, SAIC filings show that Guangzhou Yingzhou bought Ganghui Huanbao for RMB 25 million in September 2014.

917

#### Decision of shareholders meeting of Ganghui Huanbao

#### 佛山市顺德区港汇环保污水处理有限公司股东会决议

Time of meeting: 9/10/2014 会议时间: 2014年9月10日

会议地点: 本公司会议室

会议性质: 临时会议

本次股东会已于会议召开前十五天通知了全体股东。

通知股东参加会议的方式是:电话通知

会议召集人: 苏德强 会议主持人: 苏德强

应到会股东人数:3人 实际到会股东人数:3人 出席会议的股东有:苏德强、杨建林、李秀贞 列席会议的新股东有:广州盈洲投资有限公司

佛山市港汇环保污水处理有限公司股东会会议于 2014 年 9 月 10 日在本公 司会议室召开。出席本次会议的股东代表 100 %的股份, 所做出决议经全体股 东所持表决权的100%通过。

根据《公司法》及本公司章程的有关规定,本次会议表决通过:

- 同意原股东苏德强将其持有的本公司 35%的股份,原价 105 万元,以 875 万元的转让价格转让给广州盈洲投资有限公司,批准了苏德强与广州盈 洲投资有限公司签订的股权转让合同,其他股东放弃对该部分股权的优先购 买权;
- 同意杨建林将其持有的本公司 35%的股份,原价 105 万元,以 875 万 元的转让价格转让给广州盈洲投资有限公司,批准了杨建林与广州盈洲投资 有限公司签订的股权转让合同,其他股东放弃对该部分股权的优先购买权;
- 同意李秀贞将其持有的本公司30%的股份,原价90万元,以750万元 的转让价格转让给广州盈洲投资有限公司,批准了李秀贞与广州盈洲投资有 限公司签订的股权转让合同,其他股东放弃对该部分股权的优先购买权;
- 股权转让后股东的出资情况为:

广州盈洲投资有限公司,出资300万元,占本公司注册资本的100%,出资

Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired 100% of Ganghui Huanbao for RMB 25M 方式为货币资金。

- 同意广州盈洲投资有限公司作为本公司的唯一股东,公司性质变更为法 Ŧī. 人独资公司;
- 六、 同意免去苏德强法定代表人、执行董事、经理职务,同意免去杨建林公

NO. E 00008313000000000000001006-7-502674-20161012

Source: Ganghui Huanbao SAIC Filings

Strangely, SAIC filings reveal that Guangzhou Yingzhou then sold Ganghui Huanbao to the Company in December 2015 for a purchase price of only RMB 3 million, which is 96% less than CTEG reported in 2015 company filings!

#### Ganghui Huanbao

007

Guangzhou Xintao acquired

100% of Ganghui Huanbao

from Guangzhou Yingzhou

Huanbao

for RMB 3 million, approved by shareholders of Ganghui

#### Decision of Shareholders Meeting

### 佛山市顺德区港汇环保污水处理有限公司

#### 股东决定书

佛山市顺德区港汇环保污水处理有限公司股东于 2015 年 12 月 15 日作出决定,决定内容符合《中华人民共和国公司法》及本公司 章程的有关规定,内容如下:

-、同意原股东广州盈洲投资有限公司将占公司注册资本 100% 的股权, 共人民币 300 万元以人民币 300 万元转让给广州新滔水质净 化有限公司。

公司股权变更后各股东的出资情况如下:

股东1姓名(名称):广州新滔水质净化有限公司,以货币认缴出资 人民币 300 万元 (实缴人民币 300 万元),在 2015 年 12 月 15 日 已缴足,占公司注册资本100%。

- 二、同意刘光辉继续担任执行董事(法定代表人)、经理,同意 吴水满继续担任监事。
  - 三、同意就上述决议事项重新制定公司章程。
- 四、会议决定委托卜嘉豪到佛山市顺德区市场监督管理局办理本 公司的工商变更登记手续。



NO. E 00008313000000000000001007-7-502674-20161012


Source: Ganghui Huanbao SAIC filings

If the true cost of the acquisition was only RMB 3 million, SAIC filings indicate that the Company fabricated over RMB 70 million in acquisition costs. Given the evidence that the Company acquired Ganghui Huanbao from an undisclosed related party connected to the Chairman, in our opinion, this evidence of overpayment suggests that insiders used an inflated purchase price to loot the Company.

#### b. Zhongtuo Kailan Acquisition.

In November 2015, CTEG also acquired 100% equity interest in Zhongshan Zhongtuo Kailan Industry Co., Ltd. ("Zhongtuo Kailan") for a total consideration of RMB 116 million. In CTEG's <u>public</u> filings, the Company claimed that all of the Zhongtuo Kailan's ultimate beneficial owners were independent third parties. Again, we believe that this is a lie.

#### THE ZHONGSHAN ASSET OPERATION AGREEMENT



Source: http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2014/0923/LTN20140923853.pdf

SAIC filings reveal that Zhongtuo Kailan was (and continues to be) owned by <u>Guangzhou Yingzhou</u>, the entity secretly connected to the Chairman. Investors should find alarming that in 12 months, a Company acquisition is still registered to its sellers. Perhaps the Company has not bothered to update the shareholder registration because, as discussed extensively in the previous section, evidence indicates that the seller, Guangzhou Yingzhou, is an undisclosed related party secretly connected to Chairman Tsui through a series of shell companies.



9

SAIC filings also indicate that the Company paid an inflated price to purchase Zhongtuo Kailan. Filings show that undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired Zhongtuo Kailan for only RMB 20 million, in two separate transactions, the first in October 2014, and the second in May 2015.

### Zhongtuo Kailan

Decision of Shareholders Meeting

中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司 股东会决议

出席会议股东: 林永建 林植联

列席会议新增股东:广州盈洲投资有限公司(刘光辉)。

根据《公司法》及公司章程,中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司于\_2014\_年\_10

月 10 日在(中山市) 召开股东会 出席本次会议的股东共 2 人,代表公司

股东 100 %的表决权,所作出决议经公司股东表决权的\_100 %通过。决议事 Zhongtuo Kailan hold shareholders meeting on 10/10/2014 项如下:

- 1. 免 去\_ 林植联 监事的职务; 同意选举 刘光辉 任期三年, 可连选连任。
- 2. 免去 林永建 执行董事(法定代表人)兼经理的职务,同意选举 吴水 满\_为执行董事(法定代表人)兼经理,任期三年,可连选连任。
- 3. 同意 林植联 将占公司注册资本 45 %的股权,共 900 万元的出 900 万元转让给广州盈洲投资有限公司。
  - 4. 同意就上述变更事项修改公司章程相关条款。Zhongtuo Kailan for RMB 9M, approved

Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired 45% of during shareholders meeting

原股东:(签名或盖章)





Source: Zhongtuo Kailan SAIC Filings

23 Zhongtuo Kailan Equity Transfer Agreement 中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司股权转让合同 转让方: \_ 林永建 (甲方) 住所: 广东省中山市大涌镇双桂下街2号 受让方:广州盈洲投资有限公司 住所:广州市增城新塘镇牛仔路173号 The equity transfer agreement was made on 5/4/2015 at Zhongshan City 本合同由甲方与乙方就中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司的股权转 让事宜,于\_2015 年 5 月 4 日在中山市订立。 甲乙双方本着平等互利的原则,经友好协商,达成如下协议: 第一条 股权转让价格与付款方式 1、甲方同意将持有中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司 55 %的股 权共\_1100\_万元出资额,以\_1100\_万元转让给乙方,乙方同意按此价格 及金额购买上述股权。Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired 55% of Zhongtuo Kailan for RMB 11M 2、乙方同意在本合同订立十五日内以现金形式一次性向甲方支 付上述股权转让款。 第二条 保证 1、甲方保证所转让给乙方的股权是甲方在中山市中拓凯蓝实业 有限公司的真实出资,是甲方合法拥有的股权,甲方拥有完全的处分 权。甲方 保证对所转让的股权,没有设置任何抵押、质押或担保,并 免遭任何 第三人的追索。否则,由此引起的所有责任,由甲方承担。 2、甲方转让其股权后,其在中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司原享有 的权利和应承担的义务, 随股权转让而转由乙方享有与承担。 3、乙方承认中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司章程,保证按章程规定 履行义务和责任。 第三条 盈亏分担 本公司经工商行政管理机关同意并办理股东变更登记后, 乙方即 成为中山市中拓凯蓝实业有限公司的股东,按出资比例及章程规定分享 公司利润与分担亏损。 第四条 费用负担

Source: Zhongtuo Kailan SAIC Filings

SAIC filings show that Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired Zhongtuo Kailan for RMB 20 million, only to sell it to CTEG one year later for RMB 116 million. The undisclosed party secretly connected to CTEG's Chairman flipped the facility to the Company at a **5.8x markup**. But this likely understates the true cost to the Company, because Zhongtuo Kailan supposedly carried RMB 162 million in payables to an undisclosed party, which we suspect is either CTEG's Chairman or parties closely connected to him, resulting in a total purchase price of RMB 278 million, a 13.9x markup. We think the evidence is clear, just like with Ganghui Huanbao, that insiders massively inflated the purchase price of facilities acquired from undisclosed related parties.

#### c. Hanyang Shuiwu Acquisition.

A third acquisition follows a similar pattern. In November 2015, CTEG acquired 100% of Shunde Hanyang Industrial Water Supply Company Limited ("Hanyang Shuiwu") for a total consideration of RMB 87 million. In CTEG's <u>former operating agreement with Hanyang Shuiwu</u>, CTEG claimed that all of Hanyang Shuiwu's ultimate beneficial owners were independent third parties. SAIC filings reveal a different story.

Below is a screenshot from the SAIC website which discloses that Xintao is the current shareholder of Hanyang Shuiwu. However, prior shareholder information disclosed in SAIC filings reveal that Hanyang Shuiwu was previously owned by Guangzhou Yingzhou, the same undisclosed related party that was/is the beneficial owner of the other acquisitions discussed in this section.



Source: <a href="http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index">http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index</a>

The Company acquired Hanyang Shuiwu for RMB 87 million. Yet like the other transactions discussed in this section, SAIC indicates that this purchase price was massively inflated. SAIC filings show that ten months prior to the sale of Hanyang Shuiwu to CTEG, Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired the entity for only RMB 1 million!

#### Hanyang Shuiwu

Decision of Shareholders Meeting

## 佛山市顺德区韩洋水务工程有限公司 股东决定

The shareholders meeting was hold on 1/28/2015

佛山市顺德区韩洋水务工程有限公司股东于2015年 1月28日

作出决定,决定内容符合《中华人民共和国公司法》及本公司章程的 有关规定,内容如下:

-、同意陈永新将占公司注册资本100%的股权,共100万元,以

100万元转让给广州盈洲投资有限公司。

Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired 100% 二、股权转让后股东的出资情况为: of Hanyang Shuiwu for RMB 1M, approved during shareholders meeting

广州盈洲投资有限公司,实缴出资100万元,占本公司注册资

本的100%,出资方式为货币,已于变更登记时缴足。

三、同意新增股东广州盈洲投资有限公司,新股东广州盈洲投资 有限公司实缴出资 100 万元。

四、同意免去陈永新的执行董事职务;同意任命刘光辉为执行董

事(法定代表人)。 同意免去麦利明的监事职务; 同意聘任吴水满

为监事。同意免去的陈永新经理职务;同意聘任刘光辉为经理。

五、同意就变更事项重新制定公司章程。

NO. E 00010109000000000000001004-6-502669-20161012

Source: Hanyang Shuiwu SAIC Filings

SAIC filings show that the Company paid 87x times more than undisclosed related Guangzhou Yingzhou paid to acquire the exact same facility only ten months before!

Such a massive inflation of the purchase price of a facility purchased from a secretly related party is, in our opinion, so indefensible that on this basis alone, the actions of CTEG's management renders the Company uninvestable.

In aggregate, the deception appears to be systematic. Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired three entities for RMB for 46 million, then one year later flipped these same facilities to the Company for **RMB 276 million** in 2015. But because these entities carried mysterious payables to unnamed third parties, the actual cost was closer to RMB 628 million.

006



RMB'000	Guangzhou	ı Yingzhou		CTEG		Difference		
Acq Target	Date	Acquisition Cost	Date	Reported Acquisition Cost	Total Acquisition Cost	Time difference	ΔAcquisition cost	ATotal Cost
Ganghui Huanbao	9/10/2014	25,000	11/30/2015	72,948	221,563	14 months	2.9x	8.9x
Hanyang Shuiwu	1/28/2015	1,000	11/30/2015	86,801	128,655	10 months	86.8x	128.7x
Zhongtuo Kailan	5/4/2015	20,000	11/30/2015	115,776	277,712	7 months	5.8x	13.9x
Total		46,000		275,525	627,930		6.0x	13.7x

Source: Company filings, SAIC filings

If we consider only the acquisition consideration paid by the Company to acquire these three entities, it appears that undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou marked up the value of the **three entities by 6.0x** in just a year.

SAIC filings indicate that Guangzhou Yingzhou was only incorporated on July 29, 2014, just a few weeks before it acquired Ganghui Huanbao. In our opinion, this suggests that Guangzhou Yingzhou's sole purpose was to serve as a secret related party middleman through which CTEG could mark up the value of its acquisitions.

If we include the mysterious payables, the purchase price of these three facilities was inflated by 13.7x. CTEG does not disclose the identity of such creditors, but in our experience, this is an established method of quietly funneling money to undisclosed related parties. We believe, based on the size of the payables and the undisclosed related party connection to the acquired entities, that insiders are likely the beneficiary of such payments. We leave it to regulators with subpoena power to determine whether such payments ended up in the hands of insiders, but in our opinion, the evidence is compelling.

#### d. Menghui Technology.

On January 8, 2015, CTEG entered an <u>operating agreement</u> with Guangzhou Menghui Technology Company Limited ("<u>Menghui Technology</u>") to upgrade, operate and maintain its wastewater treatment facility in Zengcheng, China. The agreement states that CTEG will invest RMB 35 million into Menghui Technology in exchange for a 20-year fee, payable monthly to CTEG for services rendered. CTEG's claimed that all Menghui Technology's ultimate beneficial owners were independent third parties. Again, we believe that this is a lie.

SAIC filings reveal that Menghui Technology is owned by Guangzhou Yingzhou, the same undisclosed related party that is/was the beneficial owner of the three separate acquisitions made by CTEG in 2015.



Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index

SAIC filings indicate that Guangzhou Yingzhou purchased Menghui Technology for only RMB 500,000 just two weeks before CTEG announced it was investing RMB 35 million in the entity.

### Guangzhou Menghui Equity Transfer Agreement

广州市萌辉电子科技有限公司 股东转让股权合同书


转让方:叶树明、周池玉 受让方:广州盈洲投资有限公司

广州市萌辉电子科技有限公司是由叶树明出资 40 万元, 周池玉 10 万元共同 设立的。根据《中华人民共和国公司法》的有关规定和股东会决议,现就转让股 权事宜订立如下条款:

- 同意叶树明股东将原出资 40 万元 (占公司注册资本 80%), 全部转让给 广州盈洲投资有限公司,转让金额为40万元:
- 同意周池玉股东将原出资 10 万元 (占公司注册资本 20%), 全部转让给 广州盈洲投资有限公司,转让金额为10万元;
- 合同签订之日,受让方需将转让金额全部付给转让方。
- 四、 从 2014 年 12 月 20 日起,公司的股东为广州盈洲投资有限公司,承认修 改后的本公司章程, 并享有股东权益。

股权转让后,股东新的投资比例为:广州盈洲投资有限公司出资 50 万 元,占公司注册资本的100%。

- 至 2014年 12月 20日止,本公司债权债务已核算清楚,无隐瞒,转让和 受让股东均已认可,并已经明确按照《中华人民共和国公司法》的有关规定
- 公司红利的收益按本合同签订之日计算,转让方享有转让前的红利,受 让方享有转让后的红利。
- 七、 本合同如发生纠纷,双方协商、协商不成时向人民法院起诉。
- 本合同一式伍份,交工商机关一份,全体新旧股东各持一份,公司存档 一份,均具有同等法律效力。
- 本合同自转让方和受让方签字及公司盖章之日起生效。



Source: Guangzhou Menghui SAIC Filings

This case raises obvious questions. If the Company wanted to invest in or build a facility, why didn't CTEG do so directly? Why was the investment in Menghui Technology routed through Guangzhou Yingzhou? In our opinion, the answer is obvious. Insiders insured that the entity, worth only RMB 500,000 was first purchased by an undisclosed related party, making that undisclosed related party the beneficiary of the Company's RMB 35 million proposed investment.





Guangzhou Yingzhou acquired 100% of Guangzhou Menghui for RMB 500K

But in this case, Hong Kong regulators have a rare opportunity to stop CTEG and its insiders before further damage is done to shareholder interests.

The Company announced in 2015 Annual Report that it paid acquisition deposits in aggregate of RMB 88 million to acquire Menghui Technology and two other entities (Guangzhou Jimei and Zhongling Chemical), which are all owned by undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou or its shareholder Mr. Guanghui Liu.

All of the prepayments and other receivables (including amounts due from related parties), apart from those classified as non-current portion, are expected to be recovered or recognised as expense within one year.

For the year ended 31 December 2015, prepayment of RMB36,254,000, RMB31,870,000 and RMB20,000,000 represents acquisition deposit paid to Menghui Technology, Guangzhou Jimei and Zhongling Chemical, respectively.

As at 31 December 2014, prepayment of RMB100,000,000 represents acquisition deposit paid to Mr. Gu Yaokun for the acquisition of Guangzhou Lvyou (note 13(b)(viii)).

所有預付款項及其他應收款項(包括應 收關聯方)預期將於一年內收回或確認 為開支,惟不包括分類為非即期的部分。

截至二零一五年十二月三十一日止年 度,預付款項分別為人民幣36,254,000 元、人民幣31,870,000元及人民幣 20,000,000元,為支付予廣州萌輝、廣 州吉美及中凌化工之收購按金。

> 於二零一四年十二月三十一日,預付款 項為人民幣100,000,000元,為收購廣州 綠由支付予古耀坤先生之收購按金(附 註13(b)(viii)).

Source: CTEG 2015 Annual Report, p. 137

A simple SAIC filing record search reveals that both Guangzhou Jimei and Zhongling Chemical are also owned by undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou (or its shareholder Mr. Guanghui Liu).



Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index



# 全国企业信用信息公示系统 (广东)



Guangzhou Jimei Enviromental Protection Technology Company

广州市吉美环保科技有限公司 注册号/统一社会信用代码: 91440183773332269N



登记信息 备	案信息 动产抵押登记信息	股权出质登记信息	行政处罚信息	经营异常信息	严重违法失信信息	抽查检查信息	
Management							
Name Position 主要人			主要人员信	<b>、</b> 员信息			
序号	姓名 Guanghui Liu	职务 Executive I	irector	序号	姓名		职务
1	刘光辉	执行董事		2	罗健豪		经理
3	姚兆俊	监事					

Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index




Source: http://gsxt.gdgs.gov.cn/aiccips/index

Furthermore, SAIC filings indicate that Menghui Technology was purchased by undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou a year prior for only RMB 500,000. CTEG's acquisition deposit represented a 72.5x markup on a facility purchased by an undisclosed party a year earlier.

RMB'000	Guangzho	u Yingzhou	CTEG		
Acq Target	Date	Acquisition Cost	Date	Acquisition Deposits	
Menghui Technology	12/20/2014	500	12/31/2015	36,254	
Guangzhou Jimei	N/A	N/A	12/31/2015	31,870	
Zhongling Chemical	N/A	N/A	12/31/2015	20,000	
Total		500		88,124	

Source: SAIC Filings and Company Annual Reports

We believe that like the previous acquisitions from undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou, the Company will inflate acquisition costs, thereby hurting shareholders and unjustly enriching insiders. The difference is in this case, we believe that if regulators act quickly they can halt such undisclosed related party transactions before shareholders are irreparably harmed.



## SAIC FILINGS REVEAL FABRICATED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF ACQUISTION

In April 2014, CTEG acquired Qingyuan Lvyou Environmental Protection Technology Company Limited ("Qingyuan Lyyou"), a company engaged in sludge and solid waste treatment, for an aggregate consideration of RMB 125 million.

The Company disclosed that Qingyuan Lvyou generated a loss in 2012 and net profits of only RMB 11.9 million in 2013.

According to the unaudited management accounts for the two financial years ended 31 December 2013 of the Target, the net profit/(loss) (before and after taxation and extraordinary items) for each of the two financial years ended 31 December 2013 and the net asset value as at 31 December 2013 of the Target are as follows:

	Financial y	
	2012 RMB'000 (unaudited)	2013 RMB'000 (unaudited)
Net profit/(loss) before taxation and extraordinary items Net profit/(loss) after taxation and extraordinary items	(11,340) (11,340)	12,138 11,937
		As at 31 December 2013 RMB'000 (unaudited)
Net asset value	_	10,597

Source: CTEG Disclosable Transaction Announcement - Qingyuan Lvyou

To increase investor confidence in the transaction, Qingyuan Lvyou's founder Mr. Gu Yao Kun ("Mr. Gu") guaranteed to generate a minimum profit of HKD 80 million, HKD 100 million, and HKD 120 million for the three years 2014 through 2016, whereby he would pay cash compensation equal to ten times the shortfall in the event of missing the minimum profit threshold.

In its 2014 Annual Report, CTEG disclosed that Qingyuan Lyyou generated net profits greater than HKD 80 million in 2014, resulting in zero shortfall payments by Mr. Gu back to CTEG.8

Pursuant to the share transfer agreement, the original owner had agreed to provide a guarantee for a profit contribution from Lvyou to the profit of the Group for the year ended 31 December 2014 of not less than HK\$80,000,000. Such guarantee had been fulfilled for the year ended 31 December 2014.

Source: CTEG 2014 Annual Report, p. 21

Yet SAIC filings indicate that the Company has misrepresented the financial performance of its acquisition. Publicly available Qingyuan Lvyou SAIC filings reveal that it generated a net loss of RMB 13.8 million in 2013, and generated a net profit of only RMB 27.2 million in 2014, at least 82% less than the aggregate profits reported to investors in those two years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We confirmed within CTEG's reported financial performance that CTEG did not receive any sort of penalty payment or extroardinary income that would have been booked if the company received some type of guaranteed payment.

Source: Qingyuan Lvyou SAIC Filings

The 2013 net losses revealed in SAIC filings are corroborated by the Company's own disclosure regarding Qingyuan Lvyou's tax holiday.

According to CTEG, Qingyuan Lvyou has the right to enjoy three years of a tax holiday starting from the year in which it starts generating an operating profit. As we can see in CTEG's disclosure, Qingyuan Lvyou is not subject to income tax from 2014 to 2016, suggesting that Qingyuan Lvyou did not make money prior to 2014.

Qingyuan Lvyou Environmental Protection Technology Company Limited ("Lvyou") and Heyuan Solid Waste Centralised Disposal Centre Company Limited ("Heyuan Solid"), being entities engaged in solid waste treatment, are entitled to the 3+3 tax holiday starting from the year in which the project first generates operating revenue. Lvyou is subject to income tax at 0% from 2014 to 2016, 12.5% from 2017 to 2019, and 25% from 2020; and Heyuan Solid is subject to income tax at 0% from 2010 to 2012, 12.5% from 2013 to 2015, and 25% from 2016 onwards.

Source: 2014 Annual Report, p. 88

Qingyuan Lvyou Environmental Protection Technology Company Limited ("Qingyuan Lvyou") and Heyuan Solid Waste Centralised Disposal Centre Company Limited ("Heyuan Solid"), being entities engaged in solid waste treatment, are entitled to the 3+3 tax holiday starting from the year in which the project starts to generate operating revenue. Qingyuan Lvyou is subject to income tax at 0% from 2014 to 2016 12.5% from 2017 to 2019, and 25% from 2020 onwards; and Heyuan Solid is subject to income tax at 0% from 2010 to 2012, 12.5% from 2013 to 2015, and 25% from 2016 onwards.

Source: 2015 Annual Report, p. 104

This is consistent with SAIC filings showing a net loss in 2013, but directly contradicts the Company's prior disclosures that Qingyuan Lvyou generated a net profit of RMB 11.9 million in 2013. If Qingyuan Lvyou was indeed profitable in 2013, then the tax holiday would have begun that year, not 2014 as the Company admits.

<sup>9</sup> http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2014/0430/LTN201404301320.pdf

## ENTRUSTED OPERATIONS: UNDSICLOSED RELATED PARTY REVENUES

In the Company's 2015 annual report, a mysterious new source of revenue appeared which CTEG labelled "entrusted operation services." <sup>10</sup> The Company did not tell the market much about this segment, except that in its breakdown it disclosed that entrusted operation services accounted for RMB 131.4 million in revenue and RMB 130.9 in EBITDA, and generated an EBITDA margin of 99.7%.

Tu	rnover and S	Segment R	eporti	ng (Con	tinued)	2 收	入及分	呈部分	報(續)	
(a)	Information a	bout profit o	rloss			(a)	有關流	益利或權	<b>哲損之</b> 資	資料
	Information regard provided to the Gro the purposes of res performance is set	oup's most senion	r executive	manager	nent for		分部業	高級管理 績評估所 之資料載3	提供之可	
			Supply of industrial water	Provision of wastewater treatment plants operation services 提供污水	BOT project construction and operation services	Provision of heating services	Provision of sludge and solid waste treatment services 提供污泥及	Provision of entrusted operation services	Provision of hazardous waste treatment services 提供危險	Tota
			供應工業 用水	處理設施 營運服務	項目建設 及營運服務	提供熱服務	固體廢物 處理服務	提供委託 營運服務	廢物處理 服務	總書
	For the year ended 截至年底		2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元	2015 二零一五年 RMB'000 人民幣千元
	Revenue from external customers Inter-segment revenue	來自外部客戶的收益 分部間收益	40,204 —	353,077 36,212	318,869 —	65,518 —	361,332 21,970	131,356 —	164,603 8,383	1,434,95 66,56
	Reportable segment revenue	可呈報分部收益	40,204	389,289	318,869	65,518	383,302	131,356	172,986	1,501,52
	Adjusted EBITDA	調整後EBITDA	29,471	262,472	79,389	4,325	210,963	130,945	106,791	824,35
	Share of profits of associates/a joint venture	分佔聯營公司/一家 合營企業的溢利	_	361	_	_	_	-	1,115	1,47
	Depreciation and	折舊及攤鎖								

Source: 2015 Annual Report, p. 95

Odder still, the category of entrusted operation services did not appear in the similar breakdown of EBITDA in the 2014 annual report. The Company discloses that in 2015, 49% of the entrusted operation services came from six entities: Zhongtuo Kailan, Ganghui Huanbao, Hanyang Suiwu, Menghui Technology, Guangzhou Jimei, and Zhongling Chemical. As discussed in the previous section, all six entities are owned by or were acquired from undisclosed related party Guangzhou Yingzhou.

<sup>10</sup> In the 2014 Annual Report (p. 10), under the segment labelled "Provision of WWT" the Company discloses "entrusted operation projects." But we consider it a new source of revenue because in the segment breakdown in 2015 Annual Report (p. 95-96), CTEG reported zero revenue and zero EBITDA for this segment in 2014.

40

Entrusted Operations Services Counter-Parties						
Agreement Date	Company	Undisclosed related parties				
9/23/2014	Zhongtuo Kailan	Yes				
9/23/2014	Ganghui Huanbao	Yes				
2/10/2015	Hanyang Shuiwu	Yes				
12/31/2015	Menghui Technology	Yes				
12/31/2015	Guangzhou Jimei	Yes				
12/31/2015	Zhongling Chemical	Yes				

Source: Company Public Filings, SAIC Filings; Glaucus Opinion

EBITDA from entrusted operation services accounts for 16% of the Company's 2015 reported total EBITDA. We can infer that at least 49% of such EBITDA is supposedly generated by agreements with entities connected to the Chairman through Guangzhou Yinglong. Given that the Company reports an inexplicable 99% EBITDA margin in this segment and that CTEG lied about its connected party relationships, we question the authenticity of such reported profits.

## QUESTIONABLE LAND PURCHASE

On November 25, 2013, Xintao successfully won land use rights at an auction for RMB 44 million.



Source: http://land.fang.com/market/51ae4283-41f0-48b9-b4e1-c0b7ab47f3fd.html

According to the government website describing the auction, companies bidding for the contract had to satisfy a number of conditions. The bidder had to be able to construct and operate a wastewater treatment and other waste management facility. Additionally, the bidder was required to provide sludge disposal, solid waste treatment and heating services.

	1) 以地跃)业性八条门	, , , , , ,	`•	
		Requirement		
		准入条件	Fixed Asset	
地块编号 Block No.	Requirement for the bidding co. 产业类型及企业要求	年营业收入 Annual Revenue		年税收要求 Annual Tax
		要求 (万元)	总额 (万元)	(万元)
	1、产业类型:总部经济;	Ţ	Jnit: RMB '0000	
	2、企业要求:			
	①经营范围:同时具备污水处理及其他			
	环境污染治理设施的建设、经营。污泥			
	固废处置服务及提供配套热汽供应服			
83101217A	务。环保产品及设备技术开发、销售,	≥100000	≥39000	≥ 5000
12222	环境保护信息及技术咨询。	(2270.96 E =	(1214 64 5 =	(160545=
12222	② 2011 年的纳税总额不低于人民币	(3370.86 万元	(1314.64 万元	(168.54万元
	3000 万元。	/亩)	/亩)	/亩)
	③需获得《环境污染治理设施运营资质			
	证书》,证书等级为:生活污水甲级、			
	工业废水甲级。			

# (五) 该地块产业准入条件如下表所示:

Business Scope: Expertise in both construction and operation in wastewater treatment and other pollution management business. Sludge, solid waste treatment, and heating and steam provider. Environmental protection product and technology development, sales and consulting on relevant intelligence and technology.

Source: <a href="http://www.zcgtj.gov.cn/NewsInfo/NewsInfoDetail.aspx?NewsID=2858">http://www.zcgtj.gov.cn/NewsInfo/NewsInfoDetail.aspx?NewsID=2858</a>

As another condition for purchasing the land, construction had to begin within 12 months after signing and construction had to be completed with 36 months after signing. Signing occurred fifteen days after the Company won the concession.

## (二) 动工及竣工要求

竞得人须在签订《国有建设用地使用权出让合同》之日起 12 个月内完成项目所有立项、环评、规划等报批手续并动工开发, 须在签订《国有建设用地使用权出让合同》之日起36个月内竣工。


其中在签订《国有建设用地使用权出让合同》后,10个月内完成 规划、施工报建手续,取得《建设用地规划许可证》、《建设工程 规划许可证》和《施工许可证》,12个月内动工开发。

动工开发是指依法取得施工许可证后,需挖深基坑的项目, 基坑开挖完毕; 使用桩基的项目, 打入所有基础桩; 其他项目, 地基施工完成三分之一。竣工是指本项目已全部完成所有设计图 纸要求完成的工程量,并依法取得建设工程的《建设工程规划验 收合格证》。 The bid winner must finish all paperwork and get approval from the government

regarding to project set-up, environmental evaluation and planning, and begin the construction within 12 months after "Contract of State-Owned Construction Land Use Right Assignment" (the contract) is signed. The construction must be completed within 36 months after the contract is signed.

Source: http://www.zcgtj.gov.cn/NewsInfo/NewsInfoDetail.aspx?NewsID=2858

Below is a permit layout of the land.



Source: http://www.zcgtj.gov.cn/NewsInfo/NewsInfoDetail.aspx?NewsID=2858

Despite the condition that construction had to begin within a year after signing and be completed 36 months after signing, a Baidu map and a recently photo taken during site visit in September, 2016, reveal that nearly three years later, the Company has not commenced construction on the property.



Source: <a href="http://map.baidu.com/">http://map.baidu.com/</a>

An investigator visiting the site confirmed that at least from the outside, it did not appear that construction had begun on any facility in any meaningful way. The investigator took photos showing some pipes and other materials, but did not see any workers or buildings in progress.





Source: Site visit


Why would the Company take on debt to spend RMB 44 million in cash for a property that sits idle in violation of the land purchase contract?

## RECORD PROFITABILITY AT ODDS WITH SERIAL CAPITAL RAISING

Wastewater treatment in China is a crowded and commoditized space which is heavily regulated by the Chinese government. We would not expect a business like CTEG, without a material technological advantage over its competitors, to report financial performance which significantly deviated from its peers. Yet CTEG's reported financial performance so exceeds that of its peers that its reported figures simply defy credibility.

For example, from 2010-2015, CTEG reported returns on capital as high as 29% and never dropping below a staggering 17%. During that same period, a basket of other wastewater treatment and waste disposal companies in China reported an average return on capital of 7-9%.

In commoditized space with thousands of treatment facilities, how can a Company like CTEG without a technological advantage or economies of scale so significantly outperform other Chinese companies building the same facilities to treat the same waste?




Return on Capital (%)

Company Name	Ticker	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	Average
HKEx-listed								
Beijing Enterprise Water Group	371 HK	7.60	5.86	5.91	5.88	7.48	7.79	6.75
Kangda Int'l Environmental Group	6136 HK	N/A	N/A	10.99	10.25	8.95	7.08	9.32
China Everbright Int'l	257 HK	8.92	9.49	10.49	9.06	8.63	8.59	9.20
Tianjin Capital Envir'l Prot Group	1065 HK	5.59	5.80	5.76	5.80	6.13	6.40	5.92
Dongjian g Environmental	895 HK	13.07	15.30	14.62	9.32	8.70	9.18	11.70
Yunnan Water	6839 HK	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.34	6.37	6.26	6.99
A-share								
Chongqing Water Group	601158 CH	10.86	11.35	12.70	11.99	9.14	9.57	10.94
Beijing Capital	600008 CH	6.16	6.55	6.19	6.24	6.38	4.51	6.00
Tianjin Capital	600874 CH	5.59	5.80	5.76	5.80	6.13	6.40	5.92
Beijing Originwater	300070 CH	10.91	10.41	13.83	17.88	15.12	12.99	13.52
	Average	8.59	8.82	9.58	9.06	8.30	7.88	8.70
CT Environmental Group	1363 HK	29.22	29.11	24.48	18.81	19.66	17.85	23.19
	Difference	240%	230%	155%	108%	137%	127%	166%

Source: Bloomberg

CTEG's reported performance is just as unbelievable when looking at reported profitability. In FY 2015, CTEG reported net income margins of 42%, which was more than double the average of its peers.




Net Income Margin (%)

Company Name	Ticker	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	Average
HKEx-listed								
Beijing Enterprise Water Group	371 HK	8.07	22.63	20.13	16.92	20.10	18.18	17.68
Kangda Int'l Environmental Group	6136 HK	N/A	21.35	19.67	17.29	16.26	17.69	18.45
China Everbright Int'l	257 HK	21.04	22.99	32.94	24.90	26.80	24.43	25.52
Tianjin Capital Envir'l Prot Group	1065 HK	20.06	18.58	17.58	17.63	18.62	19.21	18.61
Dongjiang Environmental	895 HK	13.62	13.72	17.70	13.24	12.35	13.94	14.09
Yunnan Water	6839 HK	N/A	N/A	31.64	29.16	17.07	18.34	24.06
A-share		•						
Chongqing Water Group	601158 CH	39.75	43.04	48.04	47.31	35.42	34.94	41.42
Beijing Capital	600008 CH	16.19	15.20	17.59	14.65	11.19	7.70	13.75
Tianjin Capital	600874 CH	20.06	18.58	17.58	17.63	18.62	19.21	18.61
Beijing Originwater	300070 CH	35.92	34.58	32.32	26.75	27.74	26.53	30.64
	Average	21.84	23.41	25.52	22.55	20.42	20.02	22.29
	1							
CT Environmental Group	1363 HK	33.44	35.59	46.18	46.29	41.13	41.74	40.73
	Difference	53%	52%	81%	105%	101%	108%	84%


Source: Bloomberg

Such reported performance, in our opinion, appears too good to be true. It is even more suspicious that despite such record profitability (net income margins between 33-46%), CTEG is still a serial capital raiser. Since 2008, CTEG has raised a total of RMB 4.4 billion (RMB 3.5 billion since 2013) via equity and debt issuances.



Source: Company Public Filings

CTEG's supposed profits have been spent on acquisitions and capital expenditures of questionable authenticity and purpose (such as the idle land purchase), sending CTEG back to the capital markets time and again to raise money. Indeed, its cash flows spent in investing have exceeded cash flows from operations by RMB 1.9 billion since 2008.



#### Reported Cash Flow

RMB mm	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	1H'16	Total
CFO	51.1	56.1	9.1	101.7	226.6	96.9	473.3	500.2	207.8	1,722.9
CFI	(290.7)	16.9	(88.1)	(7.0)	(318.5)	(164.5)	(775.1)	(1,633.7)	(392.4)	(3,653.2)
CFF	253.1	(43.4)	37.4	(65.7)	58.1	368.2	108.8	1,399.0	223.3	2,338.6

Source: Company Public Filings

This is a major red flag and in our opinion, bolsters the credibility of evidence presented in this report, such as the MEP data, indicating that the Company is fabricating its reported profitability and financial performance.

We have seen this pattern before in other listed companies that turned out to be frauds. Like <u>CMED</u> and <u>CMR</u>, despite supposedly generating consistent and world-beating profit margins, CTEG is a serial capital raiser. Just because CTEG is in a capital-intensive business is no excuse. Recall that CMR, one of the most brazen frauds in Hong Kong history, also tried to make the excuse that its serial capital raising was justified by its need to invest in capital intensive scrap recycling facilities. We were not fooled with CMR and we are not fooled here.

## **VALUATION**

In this report, we have presented evidence which in our opinions indicates that CTEG has significantly inflated the utilization rate of its BOO water treatment facilities. For its primary Xintao facility, the Company has claimed that it operates near 100% utilization. Yet MEP data indicates it operates at 54% this level in 2013 and 2014 (the most recent year for which we have MEP data).

The BOO segment is the driver of CTEG's supposed superior profitability (relative to its peers) and the primary component in the sell-side valuation of the Company's stock. Yet the MEP data indicates such supposed profitability is a mirage. This makes sense given that the Company is a serial capital raiser, despite its inexplicable financial performance.

Other evidence also suggests that the Company is violating Hong Kong securities rules and exaggerating its reported financial performance. SAIC filings indicate that the Company fabricated the financial performance of a recent acquisition. SAIC filings also indicate that several the Company's recent acquisitions, which included mysterious payables on top of the reported aggregate consideration, were from an undisclosed related party.

When we consider the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the Company is materially misrepresenting its reported financial performance and that its management is so untrustworthy that CTEG is simply uninvestable.

But in an effort to be conservative, we prepared an estimated valuation. Based on the historical MEP data, we estimate that CTEG's revenues are at least 30% less than reported. We also believe, based on the evidence, that at best CTEG is just another player in a crowded, commoditized space littered by thousands of other companies. Accordingly, in our valuation, we normalized the Company's EBIT margins. Rather than using the Company's reported 52% EBIT margins (which we believe are fabricated), our valuation uses a blended average EBIT margin of the other Chinese wastewater treatment and waste disposal companies (28% in 2015).

#### **Glaucus Valuation**

Г		Reported		CT Environmenta	ıl Glaucus Adjust	ed Financials
RMB'000 except per share value	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
Revenue	384,307	818,116	1,434,959	384,307	818,116	1,434,959
less : est. overstated revenue				-30%	-30%	-30%
Glaucus estimated revenue				269,015	572,681	1,004,471
Other revenue	15,640	19,549	68,701	15,640	19,549	68,701
Other income gain/loss	(560)	(1,433)	94,132	(560)	(1,433)	94,132
Operating expenses	(32,954)	(66,159)	(139,257)	(32,954)	(66,159)	(139,257)
EBIT	224,768	413,247	739,076	80,577	166,705	284,296
% EBIT Margin (based on Comps)	58%	51%	52%	30%	29%	28%
Finance costs	(25,521)	(42,766)	(70,157)	(25,521)	(42,766)	(70,157)
Share of profits of associates	17,853	2,916	1,115	17,853	2,916	1,115
Share of profits of a joint venture	0	461	361	0	461	361
PBT	217,100	373,858	670,395	72,909	127,316	215,615
Taxes	(38,930)	(34,542)	(69,323)	(13,074)	(11,763)	(22,296)
% tax rate	18%	9%	10%	18%	9%	10%
Net income	178,170	339,316	601,072	59,835	115,553	193,319
Net income margin	46%	41%	42%	22%	20%	19%
EPS	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.013	0.021	0.032
% downside				66%	66%	68%
Shares outstanding	4,464,000	5,626,000	6,101,000	4,464,000	5,626,000	6,101,000

Source: Bloomberg; Glaucus estimates

<sup>11</sup> MEP data is only available for certain facilities from 2012 through 2014. Our estimate of 30% is based on our assumption that CTEG has continued to exaggerate revenues and profits at facilities in years for which MEP and other data is not available.

50

Note: We used the average EBIT margin of CTEG's peers operating in China to estimate what we believe to be the Company's real EPS.

Simply normalizing CTEG's EBIT margins implies a significant downside in the price of its shares. By applying a blended P/E ratio of its peers, and applying a 25% corruption discount, we value CTEG's shares at HKD 0.38 per share, an 82% downside from the current stock price.

P/E

Company Name	Ticker	P/E (ttm)
Beijing Enterprise Water Group	371.HK	16.46
Kangda Int'l Environmental Gr	6136.HK	9.23
China Everbright Int'l	257.HK	17.81
Tianjin Capital Envir'l Prot Gr	1065.HK	14.25
Dongjiang Environmental	895.HK	26.09
Yunnan Water	6839.HK	12.93
	Average	16.13
		T
CT Environmental - Implied Price	1363.HK	0.51
CT Environmental - Implied Price Corruption Discount		0.51
Corruption Discount		25%

Source: Bloomberg; Glaucus Estimates

But we believe that even this valuation is too generous to CTEG, given the evidence that the Company has materially deceived investors about its financial performance. In addition, CTEG's 1H 2016 debt balance has ballooned to RMB 2.3 billion. We believe that such debt levels are problematic if the Company is much less profitable than it claims (and thus generates much less EBITDA to service such debts than it claims).

Ultimately, while we conservatively value CTEG's shares at HKD 0.38 per share, given its debt levels and the scale of misrepresentations to investors and regulators, there is a reasonable probability of further downside to the Company's shares.



#### DISCLAIMER

We are short sellers. We are biased. So are long investors. So is CTEG. So are the banks that raised money for the Company. If you are invested (either long or short) in CTEG, so are you. Just because we are biased does not mean that we are wrong. We, like everyone else, are entitled to our opinions and to the right to express such opinions in a public forum. We believe that the publication of our opinions about the public companies we research is in the public interest.

You are reading a short-biased opinion piece. Obviously, we will make money if the price of CTEG stock declines. This report and all statements contained herein are the opinion of Glaucus Research Group California, LLC, and are not statements of fact. Our opinions are held in good faith, and we have based them upon publicly available evidence, which we set out in our research report to support our opinions. We conducted research and analysis based on public information in a manner that any person could have done if they had been interested in doing so. You can publicly access any piece of evidence cited in this report or that we relied on to write this report. Think critically about our report and do your own homework before making any investment decisions. We are prepared to support everything we say, if necessary, in a court of law.

As of the publication date of this report, Glaucus Research Group California, LLC (a California limited liability company) (possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) along with our clients and/or investors has a direct or indirect short position in the stock (and/or options) of the company covered herein, and therefore stands to realize significant gains if the price of CTEG's stock declines. Use Glaucus Research Group California, LLC's research at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decision with respect to the securities covered herein. The opinions expressed in this report are not investment advice nor should they be construed as investment advice or any recommendation of any kind.

Following publication of this report, we intend to continue transacting in the securities covered therein, and we may be long, short, or neutral at any time hereafter regardless of our initial opinion. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, nor shall any security be offered or sold to any person, in any jurisdiction in which such offer would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. To the best of our ability and belief, all information contained herein is accurate and reliable, and has been obtained from public sources we believe to be accurate and reliable, and who are not insiders or connected persons of the stock covered herein or who may otherwise owe any fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality to the issuer. As is evident by the contents of our research and analysis, we expend considerable time and attention in an effort to ensure that our research analysis and written materials are complete and accurate. We strive for accuracy and completeness to support our opinions, and we have a good-faith belief in everything we write, however, all such information is presented "as is," without warranty of any kind—whether express or implied.

If you are in the United Kingdom, you confirm that you are subscribing and/or accessing Glaucus Research Group California, LLC research and materials on behalf of: (A) a high net worth entity (e.g., a company with net assets of GBP 5 million or a high value trust) falling within Article 49 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the "FPO"); or (B) an investment professional (e.g., a financial institution, government or local authority, or international organization) falling within Article 19 of the FPO.

This report should only be considered in its entirety. Each section should be read in the context of the entire report, and no section, paragraph, sentence or phrases is intended by its author to stand alone or to be interpreted in isolation without reference to the rest of the report. The section headings contained in this report are for reference purposes only and may only be considered in reference to the detailed statements of opinions in their respective sections.

Glaucus Research Group California, LLC makes no representation, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any such information or with regard to the results to be obtained from its use. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice, and Glaucus Research Group California, LLC does not undertake a duty to update or supplement this report or any of the information contained herein. By downloading and opening this report you knowingly and independently agree: (i) that any dispute arising from your use of this report or viewing the material herein shall be governed by the laws of the State of California, without regard to any conflict of law provisions; (ii) to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts located within the State of California and waive your right to any other jurisdiction or applicable law, given that Glaucus Research Group California, LLC is a California limited liability company that operates in California; and (iii) that regardless of any statute or law to the contrary, any claim or cause of action arising out of or related to use of this website or the material herein must be filed within one (1) year after such claim or cause of action arose or be forever barred. The failure of Glaucus Research Group California, LLC to exercise or enforce any right or provision of this disclaimer shall not constitute a waiver of this right or provision. If any provision of this disclaimer is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the parties nevertheless agree that the court should endeavor to give effect to the parties' intentions as reflected in the provision and rule that the other provisions of this disclaimer remain in full force and effect, in particular as to this governing law and jurisdiction provision.